Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson, University of Akureyri, IS-600 Akureyri (ingo@unak.is) (http://www.ismennt.is/not/ingo)
Iceland and the Kyoto Protocol: A Bourdieuean/Foucaultian
analysis of the discourse on global environmental change in Iceland at the turn
of the millennium, Paper for the 2002 Berlin Conference
on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (Knowledge for the
Sustainability Transition: The Challenge for Social Science) (See also Global Governance Project.) [Updated draft version, 18 February 2003, see
especially the sections of findings in newspaper articles.]
See
also: “Icelandic Nationalism
and the Kyoto Protocol: an Analysis of the Discourse on Global Environmental
Change in Iceland“. Environmental Politics 14(4):495–509. August 2005.
For those of you who read Icelandic,
see also: “Íslenskt þjóðerni,
álbræðslur og Kýótóbókunin.“ Saga 44(2):115–128. 2006
Back to Ritverk Back to English Page Back to Curriculum Vitae See also Nature as Capital
Environmental debates in the 1990s
Findings
Global references in newspaper articles
Global references in official documents
Introduction
The paper analyzes aspects of the discourse on global environmental change in Iceland. These aspects are, most importantly:
The main focus of this paper concerns the increase of references to global circumstances and to the role and responsibility of Iceland in a global sense in the discourse on environmental change. At the same time, Icelandic nationalism is alive and well in this field.
The analysis is based on Foucault's method of genealogy. Genealogical analysis is used to trace the political and cultural struggles that have built up discursive principles of legitimation. These principles equip participants to see dark sands and green forests in contrast to each other as well as they divide people into groups for and against using the North East interior of Iceland to build huge hydroelectric power stations. These references are emerging as historical patterns. Furthermore, the analysis relies on Bourdieu's ideas of cultural capital and social strategies that individuals employ to gain symbolic capital. (For a fuller discussion of this approach, see, for example, Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000, 2001.) In particular, the focus here is how the various opinion groups use references to Iceland's global role and responsibility.
This paper unfolds as follows: First there is a brief summary about major environmental debates in Iceland in the 1990s, based on an earlier study. Thereafter is short description of the data collection methods. Then there are the findings in the current study of newspaper discussions and official reports. Finally there is a discussion of the discourse on global environmental change in Iceland now at the beginning of the 21st century where its moral dimensions are contrasted with the increasing use of research-based knowledge.
Environmental debates in the 1990s
In an earlier study entitled Nature as capital. Legitimating principles in the discourse on use and protection of nature in Iceland in the 1990s, finalized in August 2000 (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000, 2001), two debates taking place in the 1990s were analyzed, that is, the dark sands—green forests debate and the debate on the use of the North East interior areas of Iceland. Moreover, two other themes, those of nationalism and globalization, were identified. In particular, the theme of globalization was emerging.
The dark sands—green forests debate
If there was a beginning of this debate, it was in 1992 when the label "dark nature protection" (svört náttúruvernd) was used to make those the critics of disorganized forest growing look bad (see Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000, 2001). The label was quickly coopted by the dark protectionists and has become a symbol to identify certain views. I believe that we can see here contrasting legitimating principles. Some of the most important are (the views of the green protectionists are first because they had the upper hand):
The debate on the use of the North East interior
At the end of the 1990s there were several debates about the use of the interior areas of Iceland, in particular the South Central part and the North East. For the most part the use of the South Central interior for hydroelectric projects is not disputed. Yet there was a struggle about a hot springs area near mountain Hágöngur sunk in summer of 1998. Further, there is an ongoing struggle against the building of a dam that would destroy a part of Þjórsárver, which is on the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance and is the most important nesting area of the pink-footed goose.
The debate about the use of the North East interior seriously began in 1998–1999 over the building of the Fljótsdalur power station and Eyjabakkar dam (Eyjabakkar is a wetland important for the pink-footed goose). The electricity was to be used for a huge aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður, one of the East Fjords. This plan was abandoned when Norsk Hydro withdrew from negotiations in early 2000. That break did not last long as the larger plan for the Kárahnjúkar power station was continued in 2001. I summarize here contrasting discursive themes in the debate on the use of the North East interior (the views of those who are for and against hydroelectric power stations):
Emerging discursive themes in the late 1990s
The theme of nationalism is a very strong theme in discourses on any matter in Iceland. Those participating in various debates must ensure those, who listen, that they are not betraying Icelandic nationality. Nationalism has the status of symbolic capital. Traditionally, nationalism was most important in terms of political independence (in the post-World War II period this is, for instance, reflected in debates about NATO and the EU) and Icelandic language and literature (most importantly the medieval sagas). It has a symbolic capital to refer the uniqueness of what is Icelandic, and at the end of the 20th century, according the observations of historian Guðmundur Hálfdanarson (1999) nature is close to replacing language as a symbol of "Icelandicness". An important element is that the modern Icelander must reclaim land by growing grass and, especially, forests, but the beauty of the lava and dark sands has also gained some value in the 1990s (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000, 2001).
References to global and international conditions, agreements and not least a legal as well as moral responsibility to the world have appeared more forcefully in the late 1990s and the early years of the 21st century than they did before. If we look at the arguments of different camps in the debates, dark protectionists have always referred to the precautionary principle and used arguments derived from science (especially ecology) in their discourse. They also refer to international agreements such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the Convention on Biological Diversity and various international agreements about climate change, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Similarly the green protectionists refer to our global responsibility of using our vast land areas to grow forests and the Alaska lupine to bind carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. They also refer to international agreements such as on climate change and desertification (e.g., Andrés Arnalds 1999a, 1999b). The emphasis by the green protectionists has been moving away from nationalism (our predecessors destroyed the land so we must repair it) to the need for Iceland to have land reclamation and soil conservation accepted as a method to bind carbon dioxide.
In the debate on the use of the North East interior, those for hydroelectric power stations emphasized that using "clean", renewable power resources for an aluminium smelter would be a responsible act on Iceland's behalf, while those against the power stations discussed the importance of the interior as the largest unpopulated area in Europe (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000).
Perhaps most interesting in the late 1990s discourse was the spectrum of views towards reduction of greenhouse gas emission and trading of greenhouse gas emission quotas. The views of seven authors were analyzed. First I list those who are most radical against that there is a problem but last those who did not believe that Iceland should ask for specific greenhouse gas emissions quotas as it later was granted.
Chemist Glúmur Jón Björnsson (1998) doubts that the greenhouse gas effects are as serious as expected. He argues against the precautionary principle and says that contemporary well-being of people should enjoy doubt in this case. He points out that it is important for the developing nations to be able to use their resources without limits imposed by questionable decisions. Further, he criticizes environmentalists for claiming that they are thinking about our children when they like to reduce greenhouse gas emission. He contends that they will find much more effective technical solutions than we have to combat the greenhouse gas effects if the greenhouse effects are a problem by then.
Former chief of the National Energy Authority (Orkustofnun) Jakob Björnsson (1998, 1999) discusses the need to think about the global effects of using our resources, however small on a global scale. He points out that using Icelandic hydroelectric power for an aluminium smelter instead of building it where there is not such power, can save the atmosphere perhaps three times the greenhouse gas amount.
Andrés Arnalds (1999a, b) of the Soil Conservation Service discusses the relationship between different international agreements concerning climate change, biological diversity, and desertification that have been the results of the Rio conference in 1992. He discusses the need for Iceland to have land reclamation and soil conservation accepted as an effective method to bind carbon dioxide in accordance with different international agreements (afforestation was an accepted method already).
Political scientist Auður Ingólfsdóttir (1998, 2000) argues that it is every one's responsibility to do something about climate change caused by people. She also discusses the different interests of developing nations and industrialized nations towards the reduction of greenhouse gas emission. She criticizes the position of the Icelandic government to demand greater quotas for an increase in greenhouse gas emission than determined in Kyoto and suggests that Iceland contributes to conceptual work on designing rules about the trading of emissions quotas. Such rules, she says, should act in favor of clean, sustainable energy being used, whether in Iceland or elsewhere, and whether hydroelectric, solar, or wind energy. Only then could we talk about global benefits.
Economist and director of the Organization for the Icelandic Environment (Landvernd) Tryggvi Felixson (2000) criticizes the view represented here by Jakob Björnsson that someone is going to produce aluminium. He argues that this may not be true. He says that some fiber materials, stronger and lighter than aluminium, have already been created; these materials may be used in the future to build airplanes and other transportation devices. Furthermore, we should emphasize finding methods for producing aluminium that do not create greenhouse gases. If these two things happen, then the economic benefits of producing hydroelectric power in Iceland might not be as great as pretended by those for the power stations.
Columnist Illugi Jökulsson (1999) in his weekly radio commentary makes fun of the Icelandic government and its "fight" against The monster from Kyoto. He compares this monster with communism by beginning the commentary with paraphrasing the first words of the Communist Manifesto: "A ghost is haunting the world … a terrible monster from Japan, determined to destroy everything that happens to stand in her way …". This ghost is named the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, the only one who fights against it, the only one understanding the dangers of it, is the Icelandic government. The foreign minister, Halldór Ásgrímsson, acts as a hero like he were Bruce Willis or Arnold Schwartzenegger. He quotes that Halldór has threatened Icelanders that we could say goodbye to the welfare system if we sign the Kyoto Protocol that would effectively prevent new aluminium smelters in Iceland. While Illugi's talk was humorous, it is equally clear that he does not believe that the Kyoto Protocol threatens the Icelandic welfare system.
Chairperson of Iceland Nature Conservation Association (Náttúruverndarsamtök Íslands) Árni Finnsson (2000a, b) points out that environmental issues are now more global than ever. For instance, that Norsk Hydro did not want to destroy Eyjabakkar with a dam without the legal process of environmental impact assessment, mandated by the EU (the Fljótsdalur power station and the Eyjabakkar dam had been passed in the Icelandic Althingi prior to the legislation on environmental impact assessment in the early 1990s). Árni criticizes the interest of the Icelandic government asking for larger quotas for greenhouse gas emission and emphasizes that international cooperation is the only answer in the struggle against global climate change, pollution, the erosion of the ozone layer, and other such things. Further, he criticizes the Icelandic government for not having educated the public about climate change as required in the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
If we arrange these views on a spectrum (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000), two types of positions are on one end of it. Glúmur Jón argues that we should just wait, but the other position is that aluminium smelters are built because the world needs aluminium and, therefore, it is better to build them in Iceland using hydroelectric power than to build them where more carbon dioxide producing fuel is used. The Glúmur Jón argument may not be taken seriously, but the "the world needs aluminium" argument of Jakob supports the official position of the Icelandic government. The Glúmur Jón argument would, however, be the consequence of more aluminium smelters; that is, we wait and we see, and we might come up with better techniques. So this is a discursive connection of actually not waiting and seeing, as Glúmur Jón suggests, but actively increasing greenhouse gas emission.
On the other end of the spectrum are arguments presented by Árni and in part by Illugi that we must look globally at things and we must cooperate and comply with international agreements about combating climate change. Tryggvi also employs themes that are to a certain extent more radical than Árni and Illugi's views because he doubts that the world needs aluminium.
In the emerging global references, I found a discursive "alliance" between green protectionists' interests and those arguing for using the power resources for an aluminium smelter. We see this, for instance, in the words of farmer Sigvaldi Ásgeirsson (2000). He argues that if an aluminium smelter of 480,000 ton production capacity would pay 7 milljons USD each year to grow forest to bind carbon dioxide from the smelter. He discusses these and other figures and disputes the opinions of a dark protectionist who doubts that forest growing is a viable option in binding carbon dioxide from aluminium smelters.
A discursive alliance is different from an alliance based on conspiracy because it takes place in the historical conjuncture. If we build aluminium smelters in Iceland, either in the East or in the South West where there are also proposals to make larger the two smelters there (Straumsvík, Hvalfjörður, on both sides of Reykjavík), we increase Iceland's greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, the proponents of green protection and those who speak for the Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service point out that we have relatively large areas where we can grow the Alaska lupine and plant trees that will bind carbon dioxide (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000). We must view the words of Sigvaldi in light of this rather than find whether his calculations are exact or not.
It is my aim in this paper to further investigate these emerging global references. I shall investigate how the government and its institutions use international agreements in their discourse, and I shall search for new types of references to global circumstances.
The main sources in the Nature as Capital study were newspaper articles simultaneously collected by myself (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000). To that collection, I added a search in newspaper clippings collected by Miðlun (Fjölmiðlavaktin 1997–1999). I also investigated various studies and reports (e.g. Anna Dóra Sæþórsdóttir 1998, Ólafur Arnalds 1997, Ólafur Arnalds, Elín Fjóla Þórarinsdóttir, Sigmar Metúsalemsson, Ásgeir Jónsson, Einar Grétarsson and Arnór Árnason 1997, Rannveig Ólafsdóttir and Árni Daníel Júlíusson 1999).
In addition to the material of the earlier study, I continued to analyze my simultaneous collection of newspaper articles from August 2000 through mid-February 2003. The collection is substituted by newspaper clippings from Miðlun (Fjölmiðlavaktin 2000– September 2002) as in the earlier study (thanks to the librarians at the Environment and Food Agency and the ministry for the environment).
I also decided to investigate position papers and official reports that would be likely to refer to global circumstances. To locate such papers, I asked individuals in important positions to point out and provide materials.
First, Halldór Þorgeirsson head of office of sustainable development and international matters in the ministry for the environment was asked to locate one to three important papers that would describe the Icelandic government's position that Iceland ought to have some particular rights for greenhouse gas emission ascribed to the country. He provided five particular policy documents and working papers (Halldór Þorgeirsson 2002). One of them, Welfare for the Future (2002), is the policy of the Icelandic government about sustainable development. Tillaga (2001–2002) and Skýrsla (2001–2002) are reports to the parliaments, and Significant Proportional Impact (2001) and Issues in the Negotiating Process (2001) are working papers about the particular economic situations in Iceland.
Second, Andrés Arnalds assistant director of the Soil Conservation Service in Iceland (Landgræðslan) was asked to locate one to three documents concerning the policy of the Service and of the Icelandic government to combat how and why Iceland participates in the struggles against desertification where the role and responsibility of Iceland in the combat against global environmental change, especially climate change. He located (Andrés Arnalds 2002e) for me three policy documents (Landgræðslufréttir 1991, Landgræðsluáætlun 1997, Um landgræðsluáætlun 2002) as well as three of his own papers that also outline references to global circumstances (Andrés Arnalds 2002a, b, c)
Third, Þröstur Eysteinsson deputy director of Iceland Forest Service (Skógrækt ríkisins) was asked to locate one to three documents about the role and responsibility of Iceland and the Icelandic government in relation to climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, as these concern the Forest Service. Þröstur and Aðalsteinn Sigurgeirsson chief of Iceland Forest Research Station, a branch of Iceland Forest Service, provided (Þröstur Eysteinsson 2002, Aðalsteinn Sigurgeirsson 2002) one main document (Rannsóknir og úttektir 2002) and a few other related documents (most importantly Arnór Snorrason 2002).
Many other materials would be interesting for the same purposes. For instance, it would be interesting to investigate documents used in the environmental impact assessment process, both reports of those who want to erect power stations, build roads or dig mines, as well as the remarks sent to the Planning Agency by nature organizations and the public.
Global references in newspaper articles
In the newspaper articles from August 2000 through mid-February 2003, I found several discursive themes. These articles are written about various issues in the nature protection debates (especially the North East interior and Þjórsárver in the South Central interior), about various international agreements, most importantly about the Kyoto protocol, but also about different international meetings and conferences, as well as on the use of natural resources. One of the issues lurking behind all this are the proposals to build a huge aluminium smelter in the East and increase in size the two smelters currently in the South West (owned by Alcan and Columbia Ventures).
This discussion is arranged underneath overarching headings. Some of the topics underneath the headings include arguments both for and against using natural resources to build aluminium smelters. This rather sketchy summary of discursive themes in newspaper discussions is intended to draw some of the main features necessary in a more complete map of the discourse in Iceland on global environmental change at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st.
GLOBAL BENEFITS
One of the chief arguments put forward by those for hydroelectric power stations is that Iceland can contribute its relatively vast resources for the benefit of the world. Often repeated theme is that aluminium is light so that using this metal to build, for instance, airplanes decreases use of fossil fuels. This does not do much good, however, if coal or fossil fuels are used to produce the electricity needed for its production. Therefore by producing aluminium using hydroelectric power, Iceland can decrease the greenhouse gas emission of the world. Iceland can contribute to the world's environment because it is the global emission that matters. Closing our already existing aluminium smelters would decrease Iceland's greenhouse gas emission, but the world would be worse off. Furthermore, poorer and more populated countries need their hydroelectric resources for themselves now or in the near future (e.g., Jakob Björnsson 2000, 2002a, b). This is also contended by, for instance, politician and former minister of education, science and culture Björn Bjarnason (2002) and environmental representative of the National Power Company (Landsvirkjun) Ragnheiður Ólafsdóttir (2000).
This line of arguments is also represented in the government documents, see below. However, it is criticized by those opposing the hydroelectric power stations, for instance by Árni Finnsson (2000c) who claims that the Icelandic government has been unable to prove measurable global benefits of locating heavy industry in Iceland.
MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE
One of the most widespread arguments against using the North East interior of Iceland for hydroelectric power stations and dams is that this is considered the largest unpopulated area in Western-Europe, even in all Europe, perhaps with the exception of Spitzbergen. I include here three examples. The leading article of the right-of-center Morgunblaðið, Iceland's most influential newspaper, on April 27, 2001 is, perhaps, the most compelling account emphasizing this line of argument. It says: "Icelanders must not forget that they are taking care of the largest untouched area in Europe … These valuables will become very small if they are separated with roads, service and other man-made things … if Icelanders do not protect these interior areas that still are untouched, the next generations will only live with that man-made environment that signifies most of the western world … and this will impact our [national] identity" ("Eðli ósnortinna öræfa" 2001). Morgunblaðið does not actually mention the dam projects in this article, but it must mean them because the largest proposals for making roads in the interior are related to the Kárahnjúkar project. An outspoken church minister in the Icelandic Lutheran National Church, Örn Bárður Jónsson (2002) uses even a stronger rhetoric in his comparisons. He argues that because Iceland has no forests and because it is not as much cultivated or densely populated as most of Europe, we have untouched areas as a natural resource. Our interior areas are unique in the world, and we must contribute them to global culture. They are as important as our medieval manuscripts, and we must declare them into a global national park, Örn Bárður argues.
Biologist and writer of popular books about nature Guðmundur Páll Ólafsson (2001) compares the magnitude of environmental damage proposed by the Kárahnjúkar project with the Soviet Union and China. He contends that the Kárahnjúkar project, in conjunction with a dam that destroys a part of Þjórsárver, would be the greatest ecological damage not only in the history of Iceland but in the history of Europe.
It is also the case that some of the areas that have been and are being threatened by dam proposals, Eyjabakkar and now Þjórsárver, are important nesting places for the pink-footed goose. This leads Egill Egilsson (2000) to argue that it "will not be considered our [Icelander's] private matter in the middle of the next century [that is, the 21st century] whether we can allow ourselves to sink large grown areas in the interior, whichhost bird species that will be considered the collective property of Europeans".
One aspect of the fact that the interior areas are not populated has not often been mentioned. This is that people do not have to move from their homes such as in the large projects in China or India. This fact is so seldom mentioned that I am not sure if I should consider it as a discursive theme (see, however, Jakob Björnsson 2002b). More common is to mention that the interior areas will be accessible by ordinary cars after the Kárahnjúkar power station and dam have been erected, and it is pointed out that it would be easier to use them in (mass) tourism (Ragnheiður Ólafsdóttir 2000).
"NOT IN MY OWN BACKYARD"
One of the reasons for the interests of Norsk Hydro to build an aluminium smelter in Iceland rather than in its home country, Norway, is that Norway has decided not build more large dams for hydroelectric power stations, if I understand correctly. We can not be certain what, then, actually caused Norsk Hydro to withdraw from the plans in early 2002; environmentalists and those opposing the power stations in the interior mention it might be that many Norwegians mind such a business being done in Iceland. At the same time, current aluminium smelters' owners in Iceland, Alcan and Columbia Ventures, plan to increase the production of their smelters in Straumsvík and Hvalfjörður, requiring more electricity. Moreover, in summer of 2002, Alcoa began a serious negotiation process with the Icelandic government and the National Power Company, which led the Power Company to start building roads in the interior. The negotiations with Alcoa seem to be mostly completed (by late February 2003) although some formal matters are pending (such as a legislation about the alumium smelter in the Parliament). Furthermore, a lawsuit against the minister of the environment for her ruling in the environmental impact assessment project has not been solved.
Alcoa is suspected of wanting to build the aluminium smelter in Iceland because they are closing smelters in the USA, their home country. One of those critics, language teacher and tour guide Halldór Þorsteinsson (2002), also maintains that Vietnam, Mexico and Brazil refused to allow Alcoa to build smelters there. Alcoa has announced that the Kárahnjúkar dam is one of best hydroelectric power station option in the world. Parliament member of the Left Green Party, Þuríður Backman (2002) asks why it seems to be an interest of the government to offer a lower price and better access to natural resources than the developing countries.
Professor of land management Anna Guðrún Þórhallsdóttir (2001) discusses the ecological damage done to American rivers by dams. She cautions that Iceland should not build the proposed dams at Kárahnjúkar and by Þjórsárver.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS—INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION—INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE
As discussed above, all the parties of the two debates of the 1990s that I analyzed used to some extent references to international agreements. This trend continues, for instance in discussions of international agreements on climate change. The meeting in Kyoto in 1997 continued to draw attention because Iceland put forward its proposals for being allowed to increase the greenhouse gas emission more than suggested in the original Kyoto Protocol. Articles are often published before and after the various international meetings, such as the meetings in The Hague in 2000, Bonn in 2001 and Johannesburg in 2002.
Reflecting on these discussions and investigating the selection of articles that I have available, it is not always entirely clear which Convention exactly was discussed. Representatives of some of the government institutions seem to regularly write newspaper articles to report what happened and to urge Icelanders to participate with more force in the various measures. In one of his articles, Andrés Arnalds (2002d) points out that Iceland has unique possibilities to bind carbon dioxide. This is because of the characteristics of the volcanic soil that can bind much carbon dioxide; furthermore, there is enough precipitation in Iceland. He also points out that more binding of carbon dioxide and less greenhouse gas emission are two ways toward the same goal, but that we have to use both methods if we are to succeed. It is easier in Iceland than in most other places, he argues, to have a complete book-keeping of how much carbon dioxide is bound because we would be changing unfertile soil into fertile grounds.
References to the Ramsar List of wetland areas continue. Guðmundur Páll Ólafsson (2001) discusses Þjórsárver and argues that because they are on the Ramsar List, they are "an international treasure of the inhabitants of the earth". Gunnar Einarsson (2000) argues for "a European national park in the interior of Iceland".
The Århus Convention from 1998 has much been referred to, although Iceland has not ratified it as of yet. The Århus Convention regards citizens' rights to participate in environmental matters an important step in the development of democratic societies. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are emphasized "as an important channel for articulating the opinions of the environmentally concerned public. An engaged, critically aware public is essential to að healthy democracy", as it is phrased in the Declaration by the Ministers of Environment of the region of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1998). Furthermore, financial support for the NGOs is considered important, although part of the role of such groups is to question government policies.
In line with this, environmental activists began to push for that Iceland would confirm the statues of this convention and act towards it (Árni Finnsson 2001). Politicians such as parliament member of the right-of-center Independence Party Katrín Fjeldsted (2001), have also been pushing for the ratification. In March 2001, the representatives of eleven NGOs and the minister for the environment signed a document about cooperation paving the way for financial support (Samstarfsyfirlýsing 2001).
The role of organizations such as the EU and the OECD has been discussed. Iceland as a member of the EFTA and EER (European Economic Region) must take EU's stipulation into effect, also in environmental matters. Ólöf G. Söebech (2001) (a member of the board of the Icelandic Europe Organization, an interest group that wants Iceland to consider membership to the EU) argues that the EU has gained some success in fighting pollution as well as in the use of environmental and health standards. She points out that the EU is interested in environmental research to insure that we know the environmental impacts of the various actions.
There has been an interesting discussion about the right of rights of international environmental activists and their organizations to influence the power station debate. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has been active in distributing information to various actors, including contractors who might have had interest in building the power station in the North East interior. It has been accused of intervening into a matter that should be treated solely as a domestic affair, and Icelandic environmentalists have been considered guilty of treason (e.g., for power station activist Einar Rafn Haraldsson, in Dagur 2000).
THE IMAGE OF ICELAND
The image of Iceland is discussed in various contexts, and researchers have begun investigating how it interacts with the marketing of Icelandic products and tourism. Business economist Hákon Þór Sindrason (2000) discusses the importance of Iceland's image for marketing. Human capital, energy and unpolluted environment are among the most important characteristics, and most of the neighboring nations associate Iceland with nature, geysers, volcanos and the Icelandic pony horse. He argues for using these resources in policy making for marketing. Environmental and political scientist Heiða Björk Sturludóttir (2000) argues that Iceland's image in environmental matters may be threatened if Iceland does not take notice of eco-tourism and organic farm production, rather than mass tourism. She worries about the impact of the fact that Iceland could not ratify the Kyoto Protocol without changes (see next section).
The impact of hydroelectric power stations in the interior on the image of Iceland continues to be debated. Those against using the interior for power stations continue to argue that the magnitude of ecological destruction caused by the Kárahnjúkar project and the particular damage caused by the dam near Þjórsárver will seriously damage the image of Iceland's nature as clean and untouched (e.g., Guðmundur Páll Ólafsson 2001). The discursive theme of the image of the country is often connected to ecological arguments as well as to the global importance of certain areas (see above).
The image theme also appears in discussions about the marketing of Icelandic tourism and Icelandic goods. Director of a South West soil conservation organization Jóna Fanney Friðriksdóttir (1998) points out that it is strange that Iceland markets the country as clean and untouched but at the same it asks for a larger greenhouse gas emission quota.
The Icelandic media frequently reports how foreign media describes and discusses Iceland and Icelandic matters, and the summer of 2002 was no exception in this context. These reports and their perception in Iceland often produce some discussions as they relate to how we ourselves are concerned about how others see us. One such article was on the New York Times' front page on July 16, entitled "An Icelandic Battle of Wildlife Versus Voltage", discussed by, for instance, Björn Bjarnason (2002) because that in that article a Parliament member of the Left Green Party Kolbrún Halldórsdóttir had called Iceland "a banana republic". Guðmundur Páll Ólafsson (2002) maintains that this article is just one of many such articles in foreign media that question the Icelandic power stations' proposals.
The cleanliness of the country is a very important theme in the discourse of those for power stations (e.g., Ragnheiður Ólafsdóttir 2000). It is pointed out that 1990 (the reference year for measures in the Kyoto Protocol) most of Iceland was heated with geothermal energy and almost no houses heated with coal or fossil fuels, meaning that there is almost no possibility to reduce greenhouse gas emission in that area (Jakob Björnsson 2000).
The Icelandic has government has a special interest in clean ocean so that the country has had some initiative in cleaning the ocean (Siv Friðleifsdóttir, minister for the environment, 2003). Politicians also argue for the global responsibility for cleaning the oceans elsewhere (e.g., Rannveig Guðmundsdóttir 2001).
An interesting argument often appears in the discourse of the National Power Company and other proponents of the Kárahnjúkar project: that the project can pay for establishing a national park in the North East interior. It is pointed out that little money is used in Iceland for its national parks compared to other countries (which is true); therefore creating the power station with its dam and its reservoir can contribute money to declare the surroundings a national park (e.g. Ragnheiður Ólafsdóttir 2000).
Journalist Steingrímur Sigurgeirsson (2002) also discusses the identity of Icelanders. He focuses on that Iceland's largest export products has been fish, although aluminium and high tech products have become increasingly important in the last 35 years. Steingrímur's main concern is the economic impact of new and larger aluminium smelters (the new proposals in Reyðarfjörður, Straumsvík and Hvalfjörður together will more than threefold the aluminium production). He discusses that the more aluminium weighs in export, the less fish products will weigh; furthermore, fish product prices are due to go up and down, but so is aluminium although not necessarily at the same times as the fish price. Lastly, Steingrímur asks what kind of impact on the self-identity of Icelanders it would have to become aluminium producers not less than a fishing nation. Alternatively, he, asks, would the power stations and aluminium smelters be a step into the knowledge society? Such a discussion of identity might become an important discursive theme.
The final point in my discussion here about the image of Iceland is its connection to nationalism. Many authors look at the land and nature as a metaphor for the mountain queen (Fjallkonan) who is being threatened (e.g., Ólöf Stefanía Eyjólfsdóttir 2001, Herdís Þorvaldsdóttir 2002). The Reykjavík city-center statue of Jón Sigurðsson, the independence struggle figure of the 19th century, was dressed in aluminium foil in fall of 2002 during the struggle about Kárahnjúkar power project, and so forth.
Global references in official documents
In this section I report the main arguments that refer to global circumstances put forward by the ministry for the environment, The Soil Conservation Service in Iceland and from The Iceland Forest Service. I have arranged them under a few headings.
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ICELAND WITHIN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
It is an important theme in Iceland's nationalistic discourse to say that Iceland is special and different from others. The smallness is one such theme that repeats itself in the discussions about the Kyoto Protocol, in this case the smallness of the economy. The ministry for the environment has had the responsibility of arguing for changes in the Kyoto Protocol where Iceland was originally granted the permission to increase the greenhouse gas emission by 10%, compared to 1990.
There are at least three points that the ministry for the environment has put forward at the meetings of the climate change conventions (see, e.g., Significant Proportional Impact 2001). They were adopted into the Kyoto Protocol at the Marrakech meeting in November 2001 (Skýrsla 2001–2002, Tillaga 2001–2002).
First, there is the problem of scale, associated with the significant proportional impact of single projects on emissions of greenhouse gases. The method proposed in Kyoto does not work for small economies because single projects can dominate changes in emission from year to year. For instance, a single aluminium plant can add more than 15 per cent to the total greenhouse gas emission in Iceland, while having negligible effect on emissions in other industrialized countries.
Iceland proposed that single projects in small economies would be allowed to increase the local greenhouse gas emission. Projects would only be eligible if renewable energy is used and in cases where this use of renewable energy results in a reduction in greenhouse gas emission per unit of production. The use of best environmental practice and best available technology would also be required to be eligible in this context.
Second, the scale problem is particularly difficult for Iceland due to the fact that the possibilities for Iceland to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases are very limited. Actions had been taken before 1990 to replace fossil fuels by geothermal resources for space heating. In the absence of these measures, greenhouse gas emission would have been 40 per cent higher in Iceland in 1990 and on the same level as average emission per capita in the OECD countries. Currently, two thirds of the total energy and over 95 per cent of stationary energy (i.e., electricity and space heating) come from renewable energy sources, hydropower and geothermal energy (Significant Proportional Impact 2001).
Third, it is argued that Iceland has sources of renewable energy, which can be used for energy intensive production at the fraction of the greenhouse gas emission per unit of production resulting from the same production using fossil fuels. It is only possible to realize this global benefit, however, if the problem of scale is addressed in the Kyoto Protocol. The Icelandic government uses the example of aluminium production. Emission from the energy source is the dominant part of emission from aluminium production when fossil fuel energy sources are used to generate the electricity needed for the production. Such emission can be avoided if renewable energy is used. Aluminium smelters using coal as the energy source produce approximately seven times more greenhouse gas emission than smelters using hydropower or other renewable energy sources. It would be inconsistent with the aims and objectives of the Kyoto Protocol if states were to be prevented from using renewable energy sources for industries at the same time as industries using fossil fuels are being started elsewhere, causing many times greater emission (Significant Proportional Impact 2001).
The position of Iceland having renewable energy resources, therefore capable of contributing to the combat against the greenhouse gas effects, is emphasized by the government in its national strategy for sustainable development (Welfare for the Future 2002). The question of the actual quantity of available hydroelectric and geothermal electricity options is, however, not undisputed. Critics argue that because of environmental reasons we may have lesser availability of energy sources than we think today (e.g., Egill Egilsson 2000, Hjörleifur Guttormsson 2002). Furthermore, a reservoir will eventually be full, especially in glacier rivers, although it may take a couple of hundred years.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND RESEARCH
Similarly to the public newspaper debates, government reports increasingly include references to international agreements. In Welfare for the future (2002), Iceland's national strategy for sustainable development, it is mentioned that the country is a party to over 20 international and regional conventions in the field of environmental affairs. There is a long list of the most important global and European conventions (p. 13). The document itself is created in accordance with Agenda 21, and there are specific chapters in the document about sustainable development policy. There is a mention of intentions to ratify the Århus Convention from 1998 about the role of NGOs (see above). Moreover, it is discussed that Iceland aims at passing the European Directives on Strategic Environmental Assessment so that such assessment can take place at the planning stage. Utilization of marine resources and Iceland's role in combating pollution in the ocean are discussed.
In the most recent plans about land reclamation and soil conservation (Landgræðsluáætlun 1997, Um landgræðsluáætlun 2001–2002), there are references to that these plans are parts of Iceland's contribution to the international agreements about climate change, the combat against desertification and biological diversity. The Soil Conservation Service is also active in presenting information about the meetings of various of the agreements (see, e.g., Andrés Arnalds 1999a, b, 2002d).
The Kyoto Protocol demands accurate calculations and book-keeping methods about how much carbon dioxide is bound in forests by afforestation. In Iceland, there has been a considerable afforestation after 1990, but that is not enough. The Iceland Forest Service emphasizes that research is essential for Iceland to establish proof of that the country actually contributes by afforestation. Especially, the Forest Research Station points out to the Icelandic Althingi that if we do not gather information with research, carbon sequestration in Icelandic forests by afforestation will not be accepted by the international community as a contribution against climate change (Rannsóknir og úttektir 2002). Iceland must show how much carbon dioxide is bound in forests, and that the research costs are small amount of money compared to how much it would cost to buy greenhouse gas emission quotas. Furthermore, the money used for afforestation would not be nearly as good as an investment if there were no research results about the carbon sequestration. The Forest Research Station also points out that the possibilities for increased greenhouse gas emission because of large projects in small economies is only valid if there is good information (Rannsóknir og úttektir 2002, Arnór Snorrason 2002).
BINDING OF CARBON DIOXIDE—ICELAND'S VOLCANIC SOIL
Soil conservation and revegetation have been among the most important duties of modern Icelanders, and planting trees became a symbol of nationalism (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000). It is not space here to report on the facts about destruction of forests and soil in the course of Iceland's habitation and prior to the settlement around 900 A.D. (see, e.g., Rannveig Ólafsdóttir 2001, Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2001). What is undisputed is that a relatively large part of Iceland is a desert and only about one per cent now are covered with forests (Andrés Arnalds 2002c). This means that Iceland has a relatively large potential for growing grass or forests.
The first legislative act on forestry and the combat against desertification was passed in the Icelandic parliament in 1907 (Landgræðsluáætlun 1997). Ever since there have been governmental agencies and others that have fought the battles. Currently, they are the Soil Conservation Service of Iceland (Landgræðslan) and the Iceland Forest Service (Skógrækt ríkisins), both under the ministry of agriculture. Parliament plans to combat desertification have been passed regularly since 1974 (Landgræðslufréttir 1991). A new proposal is currently under discussion in the parliament (Um landgræðsluáætlun 2001–2002). In recent years there has also been much more research on the status of the land (e.g., Ólafur Arnalds et al. 1997).
But what can Iceland contribute to the world in this area? I shall look into the discursive themes of the Soil Conservation Service in Iceland by looking at selected writings of Andrés Arnalds, its assistant director.
Andrés Arnalds (2002c) points out that carbon sequestration, a by-product of combating soil erosion and the revegetation and reforestation of eroded land, has an important role in meeting national commitments to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Andrés Arnalds (e.g., 2002b) mentions two important points about Iceland's contribution: The Icelandic volcanic soil can bind particularly much quantity of carbon dioxide into organic matter, and the unique situation that there much unvegetated land along with enough precipitation. By this, Iceland can contribute much to the protection of climate (Andrés Arnalds 2002a). In addition to all this, because of the first point, Iceland also has particularly good conditions for book-keeping because very unfertile land is being transformed. The book-keeping methods need to be studied, but Icelandic research institutions are performing such research (Andrés Arnalds 2002a, Arnór Snorrason 2002).
Iceland and Australia fought for having revegetation accepted in the Kyoto Protocol (Skýrsla 2001–2002, Andrés Arnalds 2002a). This is so because it is not technically or economically possible to lower carbon dioxide emission enough to prevent climate change; therefore afforestation and revegetation are very important means as well. Furthermore, land decay and different land use since 1850 cause one third of the carbon dioxide in the world's atmosphere today (Andrés Arnalds 2002a). Important in this discourse is to point out that binding of carbon dioxide is not an escape from the problems caused by emission but an additional component in the combat against climate change (Andrés Arnalds 2002a).
Andrés Arnalds (2002a) discusses the cost per ton of carbon dioxide that would be sequestrated by revegetation. It could be 300–800 Icelandic crowns (3.5–9.5 euros), if original costs are balanced to a long time, against that it might cost businesses 1000 crowns (12 euros) to buy a quota from other countries.
The goal of this paper is to discuss the increase of references to global circumstances and to the role and responsibility of Iceland in the discourse on environmental change. Although it must be stated here that there is such an increase, my intent now, as mentioned above, is only to draw a sketch of important discursive themes, a sketch that is helpful in understanding—and perhaps later mapping—the discourse in Iceland on global environmental change at the turn of the millennium.
Summary of global references in newspapers 1997–2002
A brief summary indicates that one of the first types of global references is the debate about the use of foreign plants, especially the Alaska lupine that can destroy Icelandic flora in sensitive places (Skaftafell National Park). This debate was especially heated in the early and mid-1990s. In addition, in that debate, assertions about the largest unpopulated area in Europe emerged. They have become an important discursive theme in later struggles over the Icelandic interior. References to international agreements have become a more obvious theme than before, in part because of the conventions about climate change and to combat desertification that have gained attention of the green protectionists. Discussions about the greenhouse gas effects became important in this discourse soon after the Kyoto meeting in late 1997, and have been used by those for hydroelectric power stations in the interior to argue for that Iceland can provide clean renewable energy, thereby suited for the building of aluminium smelters. The image of Iceland has been discussed in this context: is Iceland an unspoilt land or is it a land of industry where the "clean" energy is used for the good of the world population? What kind of impact will the North East interior power station and the aluminium smelter have on tourists' interest of visiting Iceland? Global responsibility is an important assertion that is used by both protectionists and those for building power stations in the Icelandic interior, and that responsibility is also connected to other issues such the cleaning of the oceans.
A more complete search of the media, especially the electronic media, might allow pulling together a longer and more detailed list of those who argue in certain ways; we might find stronger patterns or principles of legitimation. This would be important for a fuller sociological or political science analyses (rooted in the methods and conceptions of Bourdieu and Foucault) of the discourse and debates.
Newspapers, other media and the public certainly discuss many other global environmental issues than are found in these analyses. Among them are, for instance, tourism, whaling, whale-watching and Agenda 21, but Agenda 21 has fertilized Local Agendas 21 in various municipalities across the country. I suspect that Agenda 21 and the phrase "sustainable development" have received some status in public discourse by that many praise it and few oppose its aims directly. This, of course, needs to be substantiated by investigating, for instance, municipal documents and discussions. Many environmental measures, such as ocean pollution or pollution because of dirty water and garbage, are not much discussed in the media.
Summary of discursive themes in government reports
The government and its institutions take notice of international agreements in their discourse. The government has argued for a special status of large projects in small economies within the Kyoto Protocol, pointing out the particular situations in Iceland that heats its houses with geothermal energy and has relatively great possibilities for hydroelectric power production, yet untapped. The Soil Conservation Service points out that Iceland has particularly good situations for binding carbon dioxide in its volcanic soil. The Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service point out that research and book-keeping methods are important so that Iceland's contributions to combat climate change are valued.
Actually there is a very short leap from these discursive themes about the status of Iceland compared to other countries, which I label as "global references", to the discourse of nationalism: the government and its institutions assert that Iceland has "unique" possibilities. This is not so entirely different from the discourse of the dark protectionists and those against power stations in the interior who also refer to what is unique in Iceland, and must therefore not be destroyed. This interplay of global references and the uniqueness of Iceland is worth much more consideration (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000, 2001, see also Guðmundur Hálfdanarson 1999).
Moral dimensions versus the use of knowledge
One of the speculative conclusions of my explorations into the discourse on global environmental change in Iceland in the most recent years is the fact that research is being conducted and used in debates. This gives us the possibility to suggest that some of the moral issues may be fading in their discursive importance. It would in fact be interesting to look at some of the issues, such as the "plight" of the East Icelanders. Their cause for needing jobs has been used in the debate about the use of the North East interior. This is definitely a moral dimension, but there has not been sufficient research about the possible changes, based on, for instance, what has taken place in other places in the world where a huge aluminium smelter comes into a small community.
The moral dimension versus knowledge established by research is, perhaps, most obvious in the debates about soil conservation. The question is if Icelandic soil is blowing away—and who is responsible for that. In the 1130s, Ari "the wise" Þorgilsson wrote: "At that time Iceland was covered with woods between mountain and coast" (Íslendingabók og Landnáma 1942, p. 2; in Icelandic: Í þann tíð var Ísland viði vaxið milli fjalls og fjöru). This quote is much debated and reiterated in any form, and it has received some kind of a symbolic status. The settlers and those who came after them supposedly destroyed the forests, in particular with using the woods to heat houses and have sheep graze too widely.
It has been seen as the task of modern Icelanders to add up for the sins of their predecessors. That is the message I received as a young boy through public debates and school. It does not matter if Iceland was indeed covered with wood or not; what matters is the guilt for doing bad to the land and the desire to grow grass and plant trees that a constant reminding of Ari's statement evokes. As symbols for the sin-driven discourse, the oil companies support the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service by contributing money; these agencies have also given seeds and fertilizer to the public in small bags (for further quotes and a discussion, see Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 2000).
There have indeed always been doubts about what exactly is the fact in this matter, and it is actually not entirely clear what Ari's statement means. The key word, viði, can, in modern Icelandic, both mean woods and bushes, even bushes lower than a foot high. What this exactly meant, however, in the language written in the 12th century or in the 19th century when the Old Icelandic language was reconstructed, I shall leave for linguists.
However, linguistics does not tell us much about the condition of the land at the settlement. Geographer Rannveig Ólafsdóttir (2001) studied the possible land cover in a selected part of Iceland by a temperature-driven dynamic model. She argues: "Previous assumptions of an extensive forest cover at the time of the Norse settlement in the late 800s were not supported by the model results. Modelling showed that the vegetation and forest cover was already in significant decline before the settlement. Anthropogenic influence presumably accelerated and increased a natural decline in vegetation cover and an associated erosion of soil in Iceland" (p. v). In short, Rannveig argues that our forefathers destroyed much less than previously assumed—in contrast to the sin-driven discourse cited above.
Compared to not so long ago, land reclamation and soil conservation has now achieved an important research base. This research shows the conditions of the land by the mapping of soil erosion. This mapping took place from 1991 to 1996. The state of the land cover is also grouped on a six degree scale. According to that scale, the land is in a serious condition on about 30 per cent of the country, including sand deserts in the interior. In additions, mountains are about 10 per cent of the country (Ólafur Arnalds et al. 1997). Afforestation also needs a research base on carbon sequestration. Such research is being prepared and conducted by the Forest Research Station, which also studies the actual land use for forests, that is, where forests are located and how large they are, the impact of forests on biological diversity and other issues (for overviews, Arnór Snorrason 2002, Rannsóknir og úttektir 2002; see also Arnór Snorrason 1998, 2000; furthermore, see Bjarni Diðrik Sigurðsson og Arnór Snorrason 2000, cited after Arnór Snorrason 2002). Some of this is not known well at the moment, but those kinds of information are a condition for the acceptance of Iceland's contributions to combat climate change. There are also references to research in the government documents from the ministry for the environment (see above).
As pointed out earlier, the research about soil erosion and afforestation is connected to the discourse on the global role and responsibility of Iceland by focusing on the possibilities to contribute the vast amount of land space and relatively fertile volcanic soil to combat the greenhouse gas effects. While it is very timely to replace the moral discourse about our forefathers' destruction of forests, we should indeed be careful about the moral elements in the global role and responsibility discourse about land reclamation, soil conservation, afforestation and aluminium production. This new moral discourse seems to lead some folks to believe that a few aluminium smelters in Iceland can indeed rescue the world from pollution caused by fossil fuel electricity production for aluminium smelters.
Some points in closing
The focus in this paper has been on the discourse about the global role and responsibility of Iceland in environmental matters— with a special focus on international agreements and the production of "clean" energy from renewable sources. It seems to me that this discourse is at least as much colored by nationalism as it is by some "true" internationalism, even by the traditional chauvinism often signified in sentences that start with We are small and few but can contribute so much because of … This can be related to Guðmundur Hálfdanarson's (1999) argument that nature is in part replacing language and culture in the national identity of Icelanders (see above) and arguments put forward by historian Stefán Pálsson (2002) that the use of hydroelectric power has become a national symbol for how the "smart" Icelanders can win their fight with the difficult nature. In this we can see that the use of natural resources, including the protection of nature, is the cultural capital of various individuals, groups and institutions that they fight to legitimize.
Let me close my discussion here with take three sets of discursive themes, presented here in simple statements. These statements signify three main positions in the discourse, that is, for hydroelectric power stations in the interior, against such stations, and a research-based green protectionist view. I focus on evaluating internationalism, nationalism, and chauvinism I find in these themes, but I also speculate about how scientifically testable the particular statements are. I shall not now analyze who belongs to each support group or the kinds of discursive alliances that might be found between the first and the third position. The supporters of theme three can indeed support either of the other views.
Theme One: We can provide clean energy for the world so that aluminium smelters do not need to burn as much fossil fuels as otherwise. This is in contrast with the second theme, as we can not easily do both. In fact, if we look at hydroelectric projects elsewhere, Iceland's contributions are not so large that this is not only nationalism but also chauvinism of a small nation that has adopted the use of hydroelectric power as one of their symbols for Icelandicness. It is possible in part to evaluate the cleanliness of the energy and renewability of the sources, but there are disagreements about, for instance, how much it is possible to prevent soil erosion caused by huge reservoirs in the interior. The supporters of this view also use the word "clean" only in terms of clean atmosphere, not "clean" environmental politics. Therefore they do not mind damaging an area on the Ramsar List of protected wetlands (Þjórsárver in the Central South interior).
Theme Two: We are responsible to the world for the protection of our environment. We have a unique land to protect—the largest unpopulated untouched area in Western Europe. This view is in part subjective, but we can also evaluate the particular values of various areas by looking at the flora and fauna, geological formations, etc. This has been done by placing certain areas on, for example, the Ramsar list and also by looking at the value of the places not only from an Icelandic perspective but also on a European or a global scale. This is in part internationalism, but there is also much nationalism, even chauvinism, in this view.
Theme Three: We can help the world by contributing our vast land to grow grass and forests and bind carbon dioxide. Some of these areas are especially well suited for soil reclamation and afforestation. Obviously, there is some chauvinism in the view, but, nevertheless, this statement is the one that comes closest to be scientifically testable of the three themes here. This view, traditionally a moral position, is now increasingly being connected to international agreements against climate change, and research is being conducted for a wiser use of investments in soil reclamation and afforestation.
Each of these positions is a legitimizing principle. The supporters of each of them refer to nationalistic arguments for the global role and responsibility of Iceland. Knowledge and research plays a greater role than before, yet the moral elements are still very strong in most of these positions.
References to newspaper articles
About the author
Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson has a masters degree in history from the University of Iceland and a doctoral degree in education from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Research interests include educational reform, the education of boys in light of profeminism and the discourse about nature and natural resources.
© 2002 Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson
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