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Nature as capital. Legitimating principles in the discourse on use and protection of nature in Iceland in the 1990s

Study report — Draft version in progress — August 2000. By Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson, The University of Akureyri, IS-602 AKUREYRI, Iceland <ingo@unak.is> <http://www.ismennt.is/not/ingo> A study belonging to a research project entitled The Use of Pierre Bourdieu's Conceptual Framework.

The dark sands—green forests debate

The debate on the use of the North East interior

The theme of nationalism

The globalization theme

Conclusions and speculations

References

If someone asks me at an international conference "How is Iceland?" I usually respond "Do you know what to do if you get lost in an Icelandic forest?" Most people say "No" with some surprise in the tone, so I tell them about the advice given to tourists: "You just stand up!" This signifies that the typical wooden area in Iceland is indeed hardly a forest. If I am seated, I often stand up to emphasize what to do—and to a further effect I walk three steps away to indicate that "real" forests in Iceland are very small, or about 1% of the size of Iceland which is the total of about 103,000 square kilometers.

Such anecdotes are meant to communicate that most of Iceland is not vegetated. And if people are still interested in talking with me I tell them about the astronauts who were trained in Iceland before they were sent to the moon. In fact, they were trained near Askja in the North East Icelandic interior, 40 to 50 miles from Lake Mývatn where I was raised. I was 11 and 13 when they were there (in 1965 and 1967, dates confirmed by a NASA memo and newspaper clippings supplied by NASA in January–February 2001). Neil Armstrong was in Iceland in 1967, according to this information. I think this one of the first times I understood that there is something extraordinary about the interior that I later on have visited both in the sheep round up but also as a tourist. Of course, I vaguely remember the Askja eruption in 1961; I remember seeing it from distance.

I tell you these stories as they represent in a way two different images of Iceland: one with dark sands and lava from still active volcanos as symbols; the other as green and covered with woods between the mountains and the coast. Throughout the years I have participated in that debate. I worked as a ranger in the national parks of Skaftafell and Jökulsárgljúfur and in the nature preservation area of Mývatn during summers in the latter part of the 1980s. Later I became interested in conceptualizing how to understand the debates and the strategies people use in these debates and their outdoor practices (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 1998/1994.)

To interpret the debates and practices, I have borrowed ideas—concepts and methods—from French historian of systems of thought, Michel Foucault, and French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu. I use Foucault's method of genealogy to trace the political and cultural struggles that have built up the discursive principles of seeing dark sands and green forests in contrast to each other (e.g., Foucault 1978). I use Bourdieu's idea of cultural capital and social strategies that people employ to gain symbolic capital to place discursive themes and the positions of individuals and groups in relation to the discursive principles (e.g., Bourdieu 1984, 1988).

In this study I look at two environmental debates in the 1990s. First, between groups I call dark and green protectionists. Second, between those for and against building large power stations in the North East interior of Iceland. But it is inaccurate to talk about them as groups that stand in different camps; rather, the authors of various articles I analyze employ ideas and rhetorical practices that appear as discursive themes. These discursive themes represent disputes over what is nature, how nature should be used, what is the best way to protect nature, and so forth. In all these accounts, nature appears as cultural capital of those who debate, although other types of capital, notably economic, also have legitimating effects. These discursive themes arrange themselves into principles of legitimation that are being constructed in the debates that I analyze (on the concept of legitimating principles as I use it, see e.g., Bourdieu 1988, Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 1993). What is struggled over is which discursive position has most symbolic power, preferably enough power to persuade the politicians to take the "right" decisions.*) In addition to the two debates, I analyze nationalism and globalization as issues as well as their discursive intersections with these two debates.

Although what I have already said might be understood as me seeing these struggles as merely symbolic, political struggles, it is also important to understand that we who participate have most of the time very strong beliefs in what we are doing and what we are arguing. Such strong beliefs often prevent the players in the debates from being reflexive about their involvement, from seeing that arguments often make most sense as being opposite to other arguments. In fact, many of the discursive themes that are analyzed in this study report do only exist because that other themes exist. This is so because we, the players in these debates, at times employ discursive themes and practices with quite some missionary zeal.

The four issues/events I selected for study are discussed in the following order:

• The dark sands—green forests debate
• The debate on the use of the North East interior
• The theme of nationalism
• The globalization theme

It was not self-evident how to define what is an issue or an event that can be observed genealogically. To find issues/events that could be observed as legitimating principles, I looked at particular moments in environmental debates and focused on how they, discursively, appeared as historically and socially constructed patterns (Foucault 1998/1972). I came up with the above four issues/events that I believe allow for the mapping of arguments that I, in line with genealogical analysis, call discursive themes.

For the purposes of this particular study, I lump together what is written on soil erosion, soil conservation, over-grazing, land reclamation, forest-growing (especially pine forest-growing), the Alaska lupine, dark sands, and the protection of Ódáðahraun, a huge lava area in the North East interior of Iceland, as these are issues/topics that intersect with each other. They serve a purpose as a definable issue that can be observed in patterns of legitimation, especially in a debate that started in 1992. Dark sands and green forests are selected as the contrasting symbols of each of the legitimating principles that I have observed appearing in these debates. The chief sources are collections of newspaper articles and commentaries: in the first place what I collected while participating in and observing the debate in 1992 to 1996; secondly, articles collected by Fjölmiðlavaktin (1997–1999).

The debate on the use of the North East interior has somewhat clearer boundaries as an event than the dark sands—green forests debate. The focus here on the dispute over hydroelectric power stations versus protection/national park use of the North East interior, taking place in the last part of the decade. In fact, the dispute over the damming of the Eyjabakkar wetland north of Vatnajökull and the Fljótsdalur power station in 1998 to 2000 is close to an event. Yet it is not the narrative of the event that I focus on but the discursive themes and legitimating patterns. I focus on the years 1997 to 1999 but in fact this debate began earlier, most notably in the debate over power lines through Ódáðahraun in 1991. I use newspaper articles from my own collection, but I also systematically screened articles collected by Fjölmiðlavaktin appearing in 1997–1999. To give an idea of the progression of the dispute, Fjölmiðlavaktin collected more than three times as many articles in December 1999 than in January the same year.

The theme of nationalism and the globalization theme appear in these two debates, the dark—green and the use of the interior. In addition to the above sources, I use, on nationalism, selected newspaper articles that display well nationalistic rhetoric as well as studies by other researchers, and, on the globalization theme, articles collected by Fjölmiðlavaktin (1997–1999) as well as more recent articles in 2000. The chief focus in regard to both these themes, nationalism and globalization, is how they are interconnected into the two above debates as well into discussions on nature and environment in a wider perspective; in short, how nationalism and globalization are cultural capital of the users of such arguments that they try to convert into symbolic capital in environmental debates.

My scientific interest in doing a study of environmental discourse in Iceland rose on my return from a Ph.D. study in education in the USA, partly after attending Conference on the Discourse of Environmental Advocacy in Alta, Utah at the end of July 1991.*) In March 1992, I was asked to talk at a conference held by the associations of Icelandic rangers and Icelandic tour guides about issues concerning tourism and nature protection. I decided to talk about the images of unspoilt nature and a true Saga Island culture (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 1998/1992). A year and a half later I participated in another conference on how people see nature (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 1998/1994). The lectures from that conference were later published in an inspiring book.

I discuss here how I became to approach this kind of research because I believe all research can be viewed as stories, as personal and political accounts of what is studied. This also explains to some extent why I use personal reference points in selecting materials for the study. I use as sources articles collected with scientific purposes but also with a political agenda in mind. Yet the research questions are not a personal reflection exercise. They are important questions, both theoretically and practically, because the disputes concerning how to use nature are, I believe, in large part due to deep-rooted personal beliefs about what is nature. And the way in which these beliefs are employed as social strategies needs to be adequately theorized and discussed.

Participating in the debates makes a study like this both easier and more difficult for me: easier as I know many discursive themes in beforehand, more difficult as I might unknowingly omit something important or being partial. Accused of being partial does not particularly worry me: why bother pretending to do a study rather than write one more essay for the protection of the interior or other valid goals? Unknowingly omitting themes important for understanding how others see nature as capital is much more likely to happen; that is, in my political pursuits, I am very likely to have overlooked discursive themes that matter in the pursuit of understanding the processes of legitimation. Systematically analyzing newspaper article collections and using material from Fjölmiðlavaktin is an attempt to add up for such an oversight.

My aims for doing the study are of two types. One goal is to utilize the concepts discursive themes, social strategies, cultural capital, symbolic capital, and legitimating principles that I have borrowed from Bourdieu and Foucault. Another goal is to map discursive themes and legitimating principles in the discourse on use and protection of nature and identify the social strategies that the players in the debates use to increase the symbolic power of their discursive themes and discursive position.

I will structure the final discussion of this report as answers, speculative and partial, to the below questions:

• What is nature? Is nature constructed through discourse?
• How is nature as capital? What are the strategies of legitimation and delegitimation?
• How are discursive themes employed as social strategies in these debates?
• Are legitimating principles in the debates? Are there spectra?
• Are the concepts discursive theme, social strategies, capital, and legitimating principles useful concepts to investigate the discourse on nature?

First, I will focus on an "event", a moment in the debates, in the summer of 1992, when the label "dark nature protection" was invented to make those who criticized the policy of greening the country, for instance by using foreign plants (the Alaska lupine, pine trees), look bad. Those who were labeled "dark protectionists" coopted the label and used it to sharpen the lines. I quote examples from the debates and show how both camps use symbolic arguments, rather than the "truth".

Let us look first at a quote from Íslendingabók that Ari "the wise" Þorgilsson wrote in the 1130s. He wrote about the times when Iceland was settled: "At that time Iceland was covered with woods between mountain and coast" (Íslendingabók og Landnáma 1942, p. 2).*) This quote is much debated and again and again reiterated in any form, and it has received some kind of a symbolic status. The settlers and those who came after them supposedly destroyed the forests, in particular with using the woods to heat houses and have sheep graze too widely. "Iceland is the only country in Europe that is seriously damaged because of acts of men", claims Nobel laureate in literature, Halldór Laxness, in his famous essay The war against the land ("Hernaðurinn gagnvart landinu") in 1970.**)

It is seen as the task of modern Icelanders to add up for the sins of their predecessors. Or that is the message I received as a boy through public debates and school. It does not matter if Iceland was indeed covered with wood or not; it is the guilt for doing bad to the land and the desire to grow grass and plant trees that a constant reminding of Ari's statement evokes that matters.*) And this is the message of politicians and presidents on moments of celebration. On New Year's Day 1992, president of Iceland Vigdís Finnbogadóttir said in her televised address to the nation: "All of us wish that we can see the country festively dressed in green vegetation, the symbol of a healthy economy and happiness of the citizens able to make use of it."**) Further, the oil companies support Iceland Forest Service (Skógrækt ríkisins) and Soil Conservation Service in Iceland (Landgræðslan) by contributing money; these agencies also give seeds and fertilizer to the public in small bags.

Of course, there are substantiated accounts of forest remains found by nature scientists and archeologists. But the goal of this discussion is not to investigate if Ari was right or wrong but to see if legitimating principles are being built up in the debate about dark sands or green forests as well as investigating how social strategies are used in these debates.

Newspaper articles written in 1992 about the protection of Ódáðahraun, the character of nature protection, and related issues are in part due to plans of building a power line from a proposed big hydroelectric power station in the North East interior. These newspaper articles offer a good entering point for looking into what I call the dark sands—green forests debate. While I do not know if the label "dark nature protection" was invented in that debate (see above), it certainly became a discursive theme in the debate at that point (Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 1998/1994). Some of these articles discuss the protests of rangers in August 1991 when their employer, the Nature Conservation Agency (Náttúruverndarráð; the Icelandic name was later changed to Náttúruvernd ríkisins) had allowed the power authorities to drive off-road in Ódáðahraun while investigating sites for the structures that hold the line. As we see below, "dark nature protection" serves a purpose not only for those who want to protect sands and lava from traffic and power lines but also for those who want to grow grass and plant forests as a theme of distinction between "them" and "us".

Below are discursive themes that build up the legitimating principles that I call "green" and "dark" nature protection. They are legitimating principles because they have developed against each other in these debates as an historical and political event. Although I particularly focus on arguments employed in the debate in 1992 the debate has continued, and I use arguments that have appeared as important later in the 1990s to establish what belongs to each principle.

Green nature protection:

• Soil erosion is a serious threat in Iceland. Soil conservation and land reclamation are very important pursuits. Many rhetorical devices are used to signify this. One of the most popular rhetorical phrases is "the untamed forces of destruction" (in Icelandic: "óheft framrás eyðileggingaraflanna", Birkir Fanndal Haraldsson 1992). Over-grazing is often mentioned as the cause of soil erosion.
• Green grass and forests are good for the country so the land and soil will not blow away. All plants that can help in the soil erosion battle are good plants. The "powerful" Alaska lupine is particularly important because it binds the soil and creates conditions for other plants notably the Icelandic birch as well as other trees. Using the Alaska lupine is also very cost-effective.
• The land was wooded and we need to reclaim the land; that is "real" nature protection (conservation). It is pointed to sources that claim that even as recently as in the beginning of the 17^th century there were woods usable for making coal for heating houses. We need to make better what our predecessors and ourselves have damaged. The nature protection of the future is based on that we have green surroundings.
• It is possible to reclaim land by growing grass and forests in quite barren areas, such as in Reykjanesskagi in the South West and Hólasandur in the North East of Iceland, north of Lake Mývatn. The Hólasandur project became heavily contested as dark protectionists were successful in requesting an environmental impact assessment of that project.
• Arguments against the cutting away of the Alaska lupine that was planted in Bæjarstaðaskógur that later became part of the Skaftafell national park as well as similar cutting away in natural areas in the city of Reykjavík. The Nature Conservation Agency made this decision for Skaftafell and the Environmental Committee of the city of Reykjavík made the decision for Reykjavík. Green protectionists felt offended by these acts.
• Many green protectionists criticized when the Nature Conservation Agency asked that an environmental impact assessment should be conducted before large land reclamation projects are begun. They do not see land reclamation similarly as, for example, roads. Many green protectionists, the Soil Conservation Service, Iceland Forest Service, and several local forest associations appealed the ruling of the Planning Agency (Skipulagsstofnun) in relation to the environmental impact assessment of the Hólasandur project (Úrskurður 1997).
• Dark protectionists admire the deserts, sands, and barren areas. It is ridiculous to protect rocks and sand. It is especially funny to do it if no one can visit the lava fields of Ódáðahraun except a few eccentric people on foot.
• Aristocrats, environmental snobs, and a theory elite think they know better than the public. They do not want "amateurs" to do land reclamation as nature protection, and they do not want the public to visit remote places using motorized vehicles.
• Dark protectionists' belief in the precautionary principle is similar to cult religion.
• Growing forests binds the carbon dioxide. Iceland is able to make a difference in global contexts because of great areas that can be used to grow forests. The Alaska lupine is also useful for such purposes.

Dark nature protection:

• The policy of growing forests and grass is a threat to the image that dark sands and lava from still active volcanos are and ought to be symbolic for Icelandic nature, along with its bird life.
• The Alaska lupine is considered a threat to the Icelandic flora in a scientific way of seeing it develop without outside help. The ecosystem is destroyed and sensitive growth is damaged because the lupine is so fierce. The lupine is often compared with the mink that escaped from cages in the 1930s, spread around the country in two or three decades and is considered fierce. It is important to get rid of it in the Skaftafell national park and several other places. Feeling good about cutting lupine in Skaftafell and Reykjavík seems to represent dark nature protection.
• Pine trees planted in rows do not belong to Icelandic nature; especially they do not belong to nature reserves or national parks such as Þingvellir, the parliament's birthplace. The settlers would not recognize Iceland covered with pine trees.
• Ódáðahraun is beautiful, black sands are beautiful, barren hills are beautiful. It is part of the North East interior, which is the largest deserted area in Europe and unique in the world for that matter. It is very important to protect it from power lines, dams, and roads, as well as appreciating its beauty. If necessary, it might be possible to place price tags on it as it is.
• Wetland is important, and too much of it was damaged or destroyed in the 20^th century. The critique of Halldór Laxness of the destruction of wetlands in the essay "The war against the land" was particularly persuasive. Among other things, he said that wetlands were the "breathing organs of the land". Further, he suggested that these acts were in part symbolic because some of that dried land was never turned into hayfields (1987/1970, p, 127–128). In the 1990s, the Forest Service was heavily criticized for drying up new wetlands to plant forests.
• Science is the ground for protection, and the precautionary principle should be used. It is necessary not only apply it to building roads, factories, and power lines but also to land reclamation and the use of foreign plants. The Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service should not be exempted from environmental impact assessment.
• Some land reclamation and forest growing projects are without clear aims, even some of the work of the Soil Conservation Service. Giving out the seeds of the Alaska lupine to the public, as the Soil Conservation Service has done, can be dangerous.
• Nationalism has also been employed as to point out that the Alaska lupine, as well as pine trees, are not Icelandic in their origin. The planting of foreign (pine) trees, for instance in the Þingvellir lava, is criticized. "Icelandic nature conservation must be to protect Icelandic nature" (in Icelandic: "Íslensk náttúruvernd hlýtur að vera að vernda íslenska náttúru", Friðrik Dagur Arnarson og Sigurborg Rögnvaldsdóttir 1992).
• Some claim that it is not possible to grow much at all in the interior. But others point out there is weak, sensitive, and beautiful growth in Ódáðahraun, there is growth near the Kjölur interior road, there is growth in Hólasandur in the North East Iceland. This growth is moss on lava and small flowers in sands and barren hills.

What I have represented here are historically and politically created legitimating principles that I have called green and dark nature protection. The players in these debates have carved out positions of symbolic use in political struggles. Often the greatest use is to distinguish themselves from others. Therefore I have overlooked the differences among those I group together because I was using selected arguments. For instance, I grouped the views of biologist Ágúst H. Bjarnason (1992) with the green principle. Yet he criticizes the use of grass and fertilizers in land reclamation projects. In fact, he suggests placing the Soil Conservation Service under the Iceland Forest Service. Teacher Sigurgeir Þorbjörnsson (1993) supports the use of the Alaska lupine but believes dark sands and barren lava should also be protected where appropriate. And tinsmith Oddur Helgi Halldórsson (1994), whose views I grouped as green, criticizes planting trees in rows, which is a theme noticeable in what some dark protectionists say.

What do Icelanders see as nature? We can begin to see a picture of that through the construction of the two contrasting legitimating principles of what is nature protection, rooted in the beliefs of those who represent them. We can see how these views are the social strategies of those who employ them. On both sides, for instance, we see what communications researchers John Opie and Norbert Elliot (1996) call jeremiad strategies, complaints over that "the land is blowing away"*) or that the Alaska lupine is threatening natural and sensitive growth. On both sides we some kind of salvation: for green protectionists that it is right to make up for the sins of our predecessors who destroyed the land by growing grass and forests; similarly, for dark protectionists, it is important to cut the Alaska lupine where it does not belong and take away the pine trees from the Þingvellir lava.

Did the 1992-to-present debate over green and dark nature protection change anything? The debate pulled out arguments of both sides. Green protectionists felt threatened by some of the views of the dark nature protectionists as well as actions like the cutting away of lupine in Skaftafell and Reykjavík and the requests for environmental impact assessments of land reclamation projects. So it seems safe to conclude that dark nature protection represents arguments that may not have had their position that much carved out prior to the these debates. An indication of the carving out of the dark nature protection principle is a newspaper commentary on the Soil Conservation Service in the summer of 1994, entitled "Land Protection or Sand Protection" (Loftur Atli Eiríksson 1994). The Soil Conservation Service was criticized for using too much of its resources to try to reclaim land in the interior. The head of the Soil Conservation Service responded that the institution had begun to rely on a greater variety of practices than it used to do. (A popular practice was to fly with seeds and fertilizers in an airplane and spread over otherwise unaccessible areas. This practice has been discontinued as of year 2000, I understand.)

Possibly, the dark protection legitimating principle is a sign of a change in aesthetic values. Dark sands, rough lava, and volcanos that previously were scary are now by many considered as a sign not only of nature but also of Icelandic national character. This theme is also apparent in the approach against power stations in the North East interior. This theme is also mentioned by historian Guðmundur Hálfdanarson in a lecture at the National Power Company meeting, April 7, 2000 ("Nýrómantísk þjóðernishyggja í umhverfismálum" 2000).

It is interesting to observe how research enters the debates. Both sides, the green and the dark, increasingly use scientific research to support their views and actions. Scientists, such as plant ecologists Sigurður H. Magnússon and Borgþór Magnússon (1996) of the Agricultural Research Institute support precautionary views towards the use of the Alaska lupine. They conducted research on the use of the Alaska lupine in Iceland. The Alaska lupine part of the debate is also summarized to some extent in a newspaper commentary in 1995 (Auðunn Arnórsson 1995). But it is quite certain that the Alaska lupine has been important in distinguishing between dark and green nature protection where the dark protectionists claimed they had science to support their views. Further, what the scientists say supports that using the Alaska lupine is not "natural" but in many cases threatening natural vegetation (e.g., plant ecologist Guðrún Jónsdóttir 1997). These views make it more difficult to argue that using the lupine is "nature". Further, the environmental impact assessment of the Hólasandur reclamation project in the North East where some precaution was mandated by the Planning Agency showed that the research on the Alaska lupine is considered. (Although much of that precaution was actually overturned by the minister of the environment, see Úrskurður 1997.)

I like to mention two research projects recently used by green protectionists. First, research on soil erosion conducted by soil scientist Ólafur Arnalds and a number of his colleagues (see Ólafur Arnalds et al. 1997) where they have invented and applied a grading system and mapped the state of soil in the country. This is also presented in an education booklet about how to read the land in this respect (Ólafur Arnalds 1997). In 1998, Ólafur received the Nordic Environmental award for this research. I am tempted to argue that this research accounts for a "wiser" debate. It seems that although I do not believe that Ólafur and his colleagues have found "the truth" about erosion in Iceland, his response in a newspaper interview after receiving the Nordic Council Environmental award in November 1998 is symbolic for belief in research instead of belief in myths about a wooden land between mountain and coast and grazing sheep and short-sighted farmers destroying it. Ólafur argues: "Everyone in the country is responsible for the land. It is not useful to blame sheep and farmers … we ought to support those who want to work … at protecting the land". And about his next project: "The idea is to gather information about the farms, the land that is used, and to support those who want to use the land in a responsible manner".*) This seems to be in line with the results of the Rannveig Ólafsdóttir and Árni Daníel Júlíusson study (1999, see below) who suggest that a greater cooperation with farmers is important in the struggle against erosion.

Second, research on the use of forests and other plants to bind carbon dioxide in order to combat the greenhouse effect (e.g., Arnór Snorrason 1998). This research is one of the discursive themes in the green nature protection principle. It seems to me that this is one of the additions in the latter part of the 1990s. I did not much look at the discourse as very few have seriously protested this view. This seems to be one of the most persuasive arguments for forest growing now, a discursive theme rather than some truth to be tested. This seems to be an argument to be contested as it also intersects with the debate on carbon dioxide quotas. (The Icelandic government wants to have larger quotas than designed in the Kyoto Protocol; thus, Iceland has not signed the Protocol, see also the section on the globalization theme.) The supporters of forest growing believe that growing them in Iceland can contribute to a global carbon dioxide binding, regardless of whether we build aluminium smelters or other heavy industry or seel the rights to someone else who is polluting (e.g., Þröstur Eysteinsson 2000). Forest scientist Arnór Snorrason (2000) who works for the Iceland Forest Service, says that preliminary results of the research gives hopes that forest growing in Iceland might bind more carbon dioxide than the Forest Service had expected in beforehand.

When I was a farm boy in 1960s and 1970s, farmers were much blamed for over-grazing the land as well as drying the wetlands (e.g., Halldór Laxness 1987/1970). During these decades farmers continued to take new land under hayfields, both wet land and dryer land, even sands. Raising more and more sheep and horses meant a greater pressure on some of the mountain interior areas to graze during summer than before. Green nature protection views often see grazing as the greatest threat to nature. Yet farmers claim that moderate sheep and horse grazing is good for the growth that is on a land, a view supported at least some scientists (Anna Guðrún Þórhallsdóttir 1997).

Geographer Rannveig Ólafsdóttir and historian Árni Daníel Júlíusson (1999) have conducted an interesting study of the views of farmers in a part of the North East Iceland, for example in the Lake Mývatn district where I was raised. In short, farmers do not admit that a moderate use of land damages it. They believe that the greatest change in land cover is caused by weather. They also believe that grazing land during winter has some dangers, a practice that now has been forbidden. Further, they believe that barren areas (melar) are natural phenomena not created by grazing of the interior but by weather. Rannveig and Árni Daníel conclude that farmers ought to be consulted more than they have been about soil conservation and land reclamation. (The number of sheep reached a peak in the late 1970s.) Moreover, they argue that many of the myths about erosion must be reconsidered because they are not supported by facts.

We must keep in mind that farmers' views as identified by Rannveig and Árni Daníel can hardly be "authentic" in any sense. For instance, they are interrelated with the views presented by the Soil Conservation Service as well as research and history. Some of them had recently fought with the Soil Conservation Service about how early in the summer they could take their sheep to the mountains. But many farmers now also work part-time for the Service. Their emphasis on weather as the cause of erosion is also due to farmers reading research on history.

Yet Rannveig and Árni Daníel's research helps unpack the "land was all covered with wood" myth. A more recent myth seems to be that the land is blowing away, which is also, at least in part, unpacked by Rannveig and Árni Daníel's research. Rannveig and Árni Daníel's critique seems to appear not only at a time when the Soil Conservation Service is focusing to a greater extent on using research to guide its practices but also at a time the Service is employing farmers to work for it. It seems to me that Rannveig and Árni Daníel's research will help the dark protectionists to blow away some of the sacredness of land reclamation and soil conservation and hopefully also the guilt for destroying the land.

The debate in 1992-to-present pulled out arguments that previously had not had such ground as contrasting views. The cultural capital of the dark nature protection is in part due to the attacks by green protectionists who perceived the various "dark" ideas and practices (i.e., discursive themes) as a threat to the symbolic value of "green" ideas and practices. In the attacks, dark nature protection gained some clout that gave it a greater distinctive value if not symbolic value. We also see a discursive juncture of science, green and dark politics, and farmers' views and practices. Following is a non-comprehensive list of contrasting themes in the debate

• Soil erosion is the most threatening force so that everything should be done to prevent erosion as well as to conserve and reclaim vegetation versus doubts about that erosion is as threatening as green protectionists demand and questioning of the policy of growing anything, anywhere, any time.
• Use of any plant that helps in growing grass and reclaiming forests is appropriate versus foreign plants that can have an impact on the ecosystem shall not be used or cautiously used.
• Fondness of the Alaska lupine and pine trees versus the Alaska lupine and pine trees does not belong to Icelandic nature.
• Large reclamation projects such as the Hólasandur project versus allegations of amateurism and requests for environmental impact assessment of such projects.
• Green grass and forests belong to the real nature that we must reclaim versus dark sands and lava is the real nature that signifies Iceland.
• Green grass and forests are beautiful versus dark sands and lava is beautiful.

• The depicting of the interest in protecting broad barren lands and lava in the interior as something dark and "ugly". Dark protectionists present green protectionists as amateurs who are, at times, destroying nature with their zeal in growing the Alaska lupine and planting grass and trees.
• Green protectionists: We shall show that we can grow anywhere (e.g., Reykjanesskagi, Hólasandur).
• The construction of a cultivated Hólasandur as not just reclaiming of land and soil but reclaiming of nature. This project was seriously contested by the dark protectionists requesting an environmental impact assessment, granted that by the minister of the environment. But for green protectionists: If the Hólasandur project is reclaiming nature, why then conducting an environmental impact assessment? So they felt outraged.
• Science is important as a theme for the dark protection principle. Consequently dark protectionists criticized amateurism in land reclamation.
• Education and research seem to gaining ground as cultural capital as opposed to green nature as cultural capital in soil conservation work and forest growing. The publicizing of the research of Ólafur Arnalds et al. (1997) symbolizes a belief in education and science; it would also be difficult for dark protectionists to argue that decisions based on that research is mere amateurism. Rector of the Icelandic Horticultural College, Sveinn Aðalsteinsson (2000) discusses the need for education of advisors to advice the public in their work of growing.
• In case of the Nature Conservation Agency cutting the Alaska lupine in Skaftafell national part and the City of Reykjavík Environmental committee deciding to cut lupine in Reykjavík, the critique of the lupine had in fact had gained some political power that green protectionists did not like. They criticized this practice heavily.
• Using the "Iceland was covered with woods between mountain and coast" tale.
• Contesting the "Iceland was covered with woods between mountain and coast" statement as a myth.
• Both parties use arguments based on nationalistic views. Interests in and acts of growing trees are considered a sign of patriotism. This relates to the "covered with woods" myth that is in fact used by most protectionists, although at least some dark protectionists criticize the power of the myth.
• Both parties use global arguments. First, the use of the precautionary principle and arguments derived from science by dark protectionists. Second, dark protectionists also argue that we have a global or at least European responsibility to protect Ódáðahraun. Third, green protectionists argue that we have a global responsibility for using our vast land to grow forests or the Alaska lupine that can bind carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

At the end of the 1990s there were several debates on the use of the interior areas of Iceland. One such debate concerned legislation about jurisdiction and planning of the interior, another one about particular dams in the South Central interior where a hot springs area near the mountain Hágöngur was sunk in the summer of 1998, and the third about Fljótsdalur hydroelectric power station and a dam that would sink the Eyjabakkar wetland. The debate in 1998 and 1999 about the Fljótsdalur power station and Eyjabakkar dam was (to date) the high peak of the dispute over hydroelectric power stations versus protection and national park use of the North East interior north of Vatnajökull.

The electricity produced in the Fljótsdalur power station and in one or two larger stations (known as Kárahnjúkar and Arnardalur) farther west than Eyjabakkar that would require several dams is, according to the plan, to be sold to an aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður in East Iceland. These latter power stations would cause very much water to be brought to different valleys than it flows through now and much greater lakes would be created than in the Eyjabakki area. Power lines, bridges, and roads are also among the man-made structures to be created as a result of these plans for energy and aluminium production. The particular plan for the Eyjabakkar dam, which was contested in 1998–1999, was abandoned in early 2000 because Norsk Hydro withdrew from negotiations about their participation in the aluminium smelter. [Some of the plans about the Kárahnjúkar station are excerpted on the National Power Company's website: http://www.lv.is/lv.nsf/pages/karahn-ens.html.]

What I attempt to do here is not record the story of these debates but to highlight the patterns of legitimation in the discursive conjuncture that the North East interior and aluminium smelter debates are a part of. I have a few hundred articles for seeing arguments for and against what I shall call the power station approach to the North East interior. I think the "against-view" might also be called "for protection" but as the debates I analyzed were more focused on Fljótsdalur power station than on anything else I have name these approaches "for" and "against". *) Besides the articles that I group for and against, I have consulted several newspaper commentaries (e.g., Friðrik Þór Guðmundsson 1998, Ragna Sara Jónsdóttir 1998, Ragna Sara Jónsdóttir and Ragnar Axelsson 1998, SJH 1998, Ragna Sara Jónsdóttir 1999, Guðni Einarsson 2000).

For power stations in the North East interior:

• The most important argument concerns the wise use of natural resources for the benefit of the Icelandic public as well as for the National Power Company (Landsvirkjun). Iceland can build larger and more cost-effective power stations for the benefit of home and light industrial use by also producing electricity for heavy industry, such as aluminium smelters.
• We have great resources of "clean" energy that we have a global responsibility to use. It will have a positive global influence on the greenhouse effect to build power stations in Iceland. By doing that we are contributing to not increasing carbon dioxide emission in the world. We as a nation would be contributing to the future dream of a sustainable world.
• It is important to create jobs in East Iceland. If we have the choice between "a thriving community and a national park", we should have a thriving community (in Icelandic: "Lifandi byggðalag eða þjóðgarður?"). This was the title of an article written by a parliament member from East Iceland, Jón Kristjánsson (1998). It is not acceptable for East Icelanders to simply have sites visited by tourists in the summer. Many people living in Reykjavík seem to think so.
• It is extremely important to create jobs in East Iceland. East Iceland is getting more and more backwards economically; people are fleeing to Reykjavík—as the numbers show well. The aluminium smelter and the power stations are the best way for developing East Iceland. "East Icelanders wish to sacrifice a small and useless area near Eyjabakkar for the benefit of all Icelanders" (in Icelandic: "Austfirðingar vilja fórna smá einskisnýtum skika við Eyjabakka undir vatn, öllum landsmönnum til hagsbóta", Magni B. Sveinsson 1999).
• Wise use of energy is compatible with nature protection and the appreciation of the national heritage. Tourists will most likely not worry about this use; they will continue to visit regardless or even because of the power stations and dams. In fact, roads built by the National Power Company enable more people than previously to visit sites in the interior. Many tourists are interested in power stations and dams.
• We do not need to conduct environmental impact assessment of the Fljótsdalur power station and the Eyjabakkar dam because we have legislation authorizing the National Power Company to build these things. This legislation is still valid because of a clause in the environmental impact assessment legislation from 1993 exempting what had been allowed by law or otherwise to be done without environmental impact assessment. Nevertheless, the National Power Company is composing an assessment report to send to the Parliament.
• Those against the power station approach are sentimental and alienated in what they want. Further, they are more interested in the well being of reindeer and birds such as the pink-footed goose than in the well being of people. A national park in the North East interior is not economically viable for East Icelanders. We ought to make decisions on the ground of rational arguments but not emotions.
• Some of those for the power station approach say very directly that those against are fanatics or even hypocrites. The fanatics are always finding some new ways to preach against progress. Their views are like cult religion. The hypocrites want to save the birds in Eyjabakkar (so that some of them can hunt them); they do not use their money to buy seeds to feed birds in Reykjavík, they do not volunteer for forest growing, they do not give money to environmental causes, they own summerhouses around the country without thinking about the environmental effects, and they would not accept if it is refused to give them a permit to build somewhere because of nature protection reasons.*)

Against power stations in the North East interior:

• The argument that the Icelandic interior is the largest unpopulated area in Europe often appears as a theme to support the importance of protecting the North East interior (the South interior has already been used to a great extent for power stations and dams). Our unspoilt area is a resource that we must protect. The interest in protecting the vast unpopulated interior areas is based on the idea that Icelandic nature is unique, at least in Europe. Vast unpopulated areas, dark sands, and lava is and ought to be most symbolic for Icelandic nature. Power stations, power lines, and dams, as well as too much development in general, are dangerous enemies of that image.
• The North East interior should be used as a national park not only for Iceland but also for all Europe. We can also make money from protecting the land. Nature protection is use of the land as a natural resource; this kind of land use is very important.
• Dams sink wetlands and other beautiful land. If they are used for keep water so that its banks are of different height from time to time, they create conditions for soil erosion. Other critics also critique sinking any area in the North East interior and point out the beauty and value of barren areas, waterfalls, canyons, reindeer life, etc. Still other emphasized that the sinking of land in Eyjabakkar and a part of Þjórsárver in the South Central interior would destroy important places for the pink-footed goose.
• Aesthetic and emotional arguments: We need remote places for our well being. The interior makes people feel better because remote places have a healing power. Emotions are equally valid as "rational" arguments. Nature has emotional value. "We have created a living emotional relationship with the part of the land, which used to be unaccessible, foreign, scary" (in Icelandic: "Við höfum myndað lifandi tilfinningatengsl við þann hluta landsins sem fram á síðustu tíma var áaðgengilegur, framandi, ógnvænlegur", Birgir Sigurðsson 1998). The author of this article, a literary author, also discussed the protection of the interior as patriotic (see below) as well as of global importance.
• The images of the North East interior's remoteness and barrenness and its size are very important for tourism. Power stations and dams may cause fewer tourists to visit Iceland than otherwise.
• The Fljótsdalur power station and Eyjabakkar dam are not cost-effective; the energy will be sold to the aluminium smelter at relatively low price, almost given away. Several economists who I do not think are radical environmentalists have discussed this (the National Power Company does not release the possible price for the electricity to be paid by the aluminium smelter.) Doubts are also expressed about economic benefits of the Kárahnjúkar power station (but not as serious).
• Heavy industry such as an aluminium smelter is yesterday's work, and it is does not create good jobs. In Iceland, also in the East, we ought to use our brains to create different jobs. We can not be sure that building such a smelter and the sinking of large areas in the North East interior will in fact "save the ordinary East Icelander" (in Icelandic: "björgun óbreyttra Austfirðinga", Tryggvi Már Gunnarsson 1998) and turn the tide of people moving from the rural parts to the capital city area. Each job created in the smelter is very expensive compared to creating other jobs. It is unlikely that people move from Reykjavík to work in the aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður. Unfortunately, East Icelanders are pawns in a political struggle.
• The Icelandic nation is rich and well educated; it does not want or need heavy industry. It is not necessary for its well being to do this. It could be socially dangerous, as there is not enough manpower and will not be enough manpower to fill the positions in the smelter. We can afford to save land any future use rather than using it for some short-term benefits.
• We may not have as much energy as many suppose we have because the environmental costs are too high although it would be possible to tap the energy and build power stations. We may as well save the possibilities for building power stations in the proposed areas for future use. It has also been criticized in this context that the farmers who have greenhouses to grow vegetables and other products have to buy electricity for high costs.
• The clause to exempt the Fljótsdalur power station and the Eyjabakkar dam from environmental impact assessment should not be valid. In fact, it is doubtful if the exemption meets applicable EU standards. (This is discussed by environmental advisor Stefán Gíslason 1999). The assessment report composed by the National Power Company does no good because it does not go through the proper administrative channels. It has been decided to build the power station regardless of what comes out of this report.
• A critique on the technological views prevalent in the approach for the power station. "The National Power Company calculates natural pearls and waters of Iceland as percentages of the square measure of Iceland".*) Many of those for the power station approach are fanatical supporters of a cult-like mission as discussed by writer Birgir Sigurðsson (1998) who argues that the agenda for the power station and the Eyjabakkar dam represents a mission in good faith, a dangerous mission of politicians.
• Arguments about that we indeed can measure the economic value of the interior as it is and would be if it is used for protection. This economic value is found in beauty, remoteness, silence, etc. It would be possible to place such a price tag on the interior by doing a survey asking people how much they would accept their taxes be raised in order to save the interior areas at stake. It was also pointed out that such price of nature would indeed increase in the future.
• To be considered as discursive are practices such as the flag pole that biologist, writer and activist Guðmundur Páll Ólafsson set up in the hot springs area near Hágöngur in the summer of 1998, artists readings poems in front of the Parliament building in Reykjavík during the winter of 1998–1999, a hunger strike by two young women over Christmas 1998, and tens of thousands of people signing a petition demanding that environmental impact assessment of the Fljótsdalur power station to be conducted.

It is not my goal to assess if the debate actually prevented the Eyjabakkar dam to be built or speculate if it will prevent the much larger Kárahnjúkar dams and lake, to be created in the next few years as the National Power Company aims to do, if negotiations about an aluminium smelter are successful. It was my goal to identify the different themes that constitute the legitimating principles for and against the power station approach.

We see here several junctures in the pattern of legitimation. Both dark and green protection arguments were used in the Eyjabakkar debate. Clearly the fact that the site is vegetated made a difference, and many seem to believe it is all right to sink barren, ungrown areas. I believe that every one who employs dark nature protection arguments also employs most of the arguments mentioned here as the against the power station approach; some of the same people are cited here as both dark nature protectionists and against the power station. I am much less certain that all those whom I cited as "green" necessarily are against the power station approach. In fact, I cited no one from that selection here but one person is cited both as a green protectionist and for the power station approach.

Other important discursive connections include the conjuncture of this debate and rural politics and migration patterns. Many of those for the power station and the aluminium smelter seem to be for it because they believe it will help East Iceland to thrive: They may in fact not be all that interested in the power station if it used to produce electricity to use for heavy industry elsewhere in the country or to export by cable as has been discussed in the past; they pointed out that there were no loud protests against the Fljótsdalur power station around 1990 when it was proposed to use the electricity for an aluminium smelter near Reykjavík. Those against the power station also discuss migration politics, casting doubt on the value of the power station and aluminium smelter plans for East Iceland. Clearly, rural politics and migration patterns are important in legitimating arguments in this debate.

In the debate we can see how different types of capital are converted although economic arguments seem to frame the discussions. It is pointed out that the nation could make money by building the power station to smelt aluminium, and it is doubted that this is true. Further, those against the power station and for the protection of the interior discuss its use as national parks and for tourism; they argue that we can make money bye protecting vast areas and barren landscape. Those against the power station approach also talk about the almost mythical value of the remoteness and silence found in the interior. Thus attempts are being made to ask people how much higher taxes they would like to pay to keep an access to undamaged interior areas.

Both parties argue that their approach is good for tourism. In a recent report, geographer Anna Dóra Sæþórsdóttir (1998) pulls together several studies of tourism and discusses the possible influences of large dams and hydroelectric power stations north of Vatnajökull. While her study, financed by the ministry of industry and business and the National Power Company, is not entirely conclusive, it seems that those against the power station approach can find stronger arguments for their position in the study. However, Anna Dóra suggests that tourism north of Vatnajökull might change—not necessarily decrease—because that the distinctive characteristics of the area would be lost and different people visit the area (p. 105). If this is accurate, both parties are right in a certain perspective.

It has been criticized to try to place a price tag on everything. Árni Bergmann (1998), former editor of Þjóðviljinn, the socialist newspaper, discusses how now not only the National Power Company flags its calculations and numbers of profit, but how nature protectionists and the tourist branch ask the questions of what we might lose in terms of money if power stations are built. He does not seem to be surprised by this happening: every aspect of life seems to be marketized nowadays. This applies to friendship, love, and sex. The market discourse demands people to place price tags on everything because what is not price-tagged is under-valued. I believe Árni's argument is very much like the analysis of Bourdieu (1998) about the "tyranny" of the market.

• The nation can make money from building power stations in the North East interior versus the North East interior is more valuable for protection purposes so it should be used as a national park.
• Most of the interior is of relatively low value versus the inner value of remoteness, barrenness, and silence that is becoming accessible for the public.
• An aluminium smelter will help the East by providing jobs versus an aluminium smelter will, at best, make no difference for the East—and most likely harm the East.
• An aluminium smelter creates jobs versus each job in an aluminium smelter is very expensive not only environmentally but in financially
• We have a global responsibility for using our "clean" energy resources to combat the greenhouse effect versus we have a global responsibility for protecting the largest unpopulated area in Europe.
• We have plenty of energy resources versus we do not have endless sources for electricity production.
• Tourists can access the interior because roads have been built and they are indeed interested in power stations and dams versus the power station approach is harmful for tourism and destroys the image of the interior as a natural and remote place.
• The National Power Company has a right to build the Eyjabakkar dam versus it is important to conduct a proper environmental impact assessment of the project.

• The National Power Company does not participate in the debates except when critiqued for that the power station proposals are not economically viable; then they speak up. Those against the power station approach, therefore, apply the calculations of economists doubting the Power Company's calculations.
• Those against the power station approach argue that protecting the interior is an important use of natural resources. They say it can be used for tourism, and that we are saving it for the future.
• Many of those against the power station approach emphasized the beauty of the Eyjabakkar wetlands, while others used emphasized arguments about the beauty of sands and lava as in the dark sands—green forests debate.
• Those against the power station approach employ the language of "using natural resources" when they argue that creating a national park is important use of land.
• Those against the power station approach were, by those for the power station, depicted as emotional and not rational bird lovers not interested in the well being of people, at least not the people in the East of Iceland.
• Those for the power station approach are accused of being technocrats.
• Both parties depicted by the other party as fanatics of cult religion.
• Some of the arguments against the power station approach are patriotic indeed; I will discuss what Birgir Sigurðsson (1998) calls the "living emotional relationship" with the land further in the chapter of the report that deals with the theme of nationalism. Some of the symbols used in the struggle over the interior are nationalistic. And it is "Icelandic" nature and "Icelandic" power that is at stake.
• Both parties employ global arguments. Those for the power station approach argue that we have a global responsibility for protecting the largest unpopulated area in Europe, and those against the power station approach argue that we have a global responsibility for using our "clean" energy resources for the benefit of the world.

The aim of this discussion is to consider how nationalism and patriotism, sometimes in the form of guilt because of our predecessors' sins, are interconnected with the green—dark and the North East interior debates. Nationalism and patriotism have, traditionally, a great power to legitimate ideas and practices; nationalism has much symbolic power in Icelandic discourse on almost any topic.

Literary theorist Gísli Sigurðsson (1996) argues that Icelandic nationalism is constructed of a trinity: Icelandic language, Icelandic history preserved in the sagas, and the land itself. These three factors have, according to him, been most important in developing Icelandic national identity in present times. He reports great tendencies to devalue art or ideas that do not fit this trinity; for instance, abstract art was greatly contested in the mid-20^th century as an attack on Icelandic national identity and that the crafts have not been considered a part of Icelandicness. In short, the legitimating power of the Icelandic language, saga, and nature as "real" is great. Patriotic poems about the glorious past and beautiful nature of the country are a case in point. Children have read and still read them in school. When city poets and poets not relying on the traditional use of rhyme and alliteration came to the story, after World War Two, their work was looked at as treason, and the poets blamed for being insufficiently nationalistic. Gísli also analyzed the agenda organized for official visits of heads of states to Iceland and found that two places were most often visited. One is the Árni Magnússon institute where the medieval manuscripts of the sagas, repatriated to Iceland from Denmark in the 1970s and 1980s, are stored and researched; the other is the Icelandic parliament's birthplace, Þingvellir, which does not only signify history and culture but nature as well. Gísli's study shows that authorities in Iceland believe that it is most important to show the "roots" of language and history to visitors.

Guðmundur Hálfdanarson (1999) has analyzed the role of nature in Icelandic national identity. First he looked at the development of nationalism in the 19^th century as it appeared in the form of patriotic poetry glorifying the beauty of the land in a romantic fashion. Nevertheless, he argues, it was the culture, especially language and literature, that was most used in the struggles for independence. Furthermore, Icelanders of the late 19^th and early 20^th century emphasized cultivating the tongue and the land. They saw as beautiful those parts of the land that were easy to change into hayfields. Some of the late 19^th and early 20^th century Icelanders wanted to use the waterfalls, glorified by the romantic poets, as sources of energy for hydroelectric power stations. Guðmundur argues that now, at the end of the 20^th century, the nature of the island named Iceland has an enhanced role in what makes Icelanders a nation; nature creates the national character and makes us different from those who live under different natural circumstances. For instance, he analyzed two parliamentary debates about aluminium smelters: In 1965, parliament members focused on who was going to own the smelter that Alusuisse built in Straumsvík near Hafnarfjörður; in 1997, they focused on the impact on nature of the smelter that Columbia Ventures built in Hvalfjörður. Further, he cites how foreign journalists depict singer Björk Guðmundsdóttir as a product of Icelandic nature, such as long summer days and winter nights, glaciers, geysers, and volcanos. (Guðmundur cites this through Morgunblaðið (September 25, 1998) that cites this after the music magazine Mojo.) Guðmundur cites a few other examples of the importance of nature in relation to nationalism and the shaping of national identity and goes so far to say that nature is in the process of replacing language and culture as the most important symbol of Icelandicness. This conclusion has not been well received by, for instance, linguist Kristján Árnason. (See a footnote in Guðmundur Hálfdanarson's (1999) paper on newspaper interviews with him and Kristján Árnason. Further, I remember radio discussions on this topic where at least Guðmundur og Kristján debated if nature really is now more important in Icelandicness than history or language.)

How do the analyses of Gísli Sigurðsson (1996) and Guðmundur Hálfdanarson (1999) interconnect with the two debates that I analyzed above? The interconnections between history and nature in Þingvellir are indeed very important; dark protectionists have emphasized the out-of-place character of planting foreign trees (pine trees) in the Þingvellir lava. The views of the early 20^th century Icelanders towards nature may be very near the views of the green protectionists in regard to the importance of cultivating, although green protectionists tend to blame sheep and horse grazing that was very important in the early 20^th century. Both Gísli and Guðmundur seem to throw some light on why dark protection views are able to gain clout now. Most of the people of the late 20^th century live in a city as opposed to what Icelanders did a century ago. They do not need to struggle with nature so that they can focus on appreciating the beauty of dark sands and rough lava in Ódáðahraun and elsewhere. Further, many city people visit relatively remote places in the interior that very few people visited before. Therefore they can appreciate beauty that only few poets had mentioned before.

I argued that both parties in the dark—green debate use arguments based on nationalistic views. Both sides use jeremiadic strategies that we must add up for the sins of our predecessors. Green protectionists say that we must reclaim the bushes and woods that have been destroyed; dark protectionists want to reclaim the "natural" character of land where the Alaska lupine and pine trees have inappropriately planted.

Some of the symbols used in the struggle over power stations in the interior are nationalistic. For instance, it is "Icelandic" nature and "Icelandic" power that are at stake. Those against the power station approach use nationalistic arguments to a greater extent than those for it. I cite here two well-known writers. Birgir Sigurðsson (1998) focuses on the "living emotional relationship" with the land (as discussed above). He continues: "In the struggles for independence the land, its spirit and its soul, became a part of our national identity … The grandeur of the mountains and beauty of the valleys became integrated with our love for history, literature, and the mother tongue". Birgir goes on to say that now when we are independent and not threatened by the cold war, our love for the nature has deepened: "Now it brings with it the duty to take care of the land to the same degree we love it. This is a new part of patriotism that did not exist in the struggle for independence".*) Our patriotism is also new, Birgir argues, in the sense that it is not only national, it is now international as well. And "our responsibility towards our own natural wealth is much greater than many other nations' responsibility because in our unspoilt nature is richness lost to most other nations".**) Finally, Birgir claims that the requests for protection of the interior are not primarily from nature protectionists; rather they represent "an invocation from the deep of the nation".***)

In his article To destroy manuscripts ("Að eyða handritum"), Guðmundur Páll Ólafsson (1998) uses a comparison with the medieval manuscripts of the sagas that were repatriated to Iceland in the 1970s and 1980s. He reiterates a story from 1623 when ancient manuscripts and documents were burned in the Helgafell cloister in West Iceland. In that fire Icelandic saga and culture was burned because of lack of knowledge and respect and reminds us that nowadays we would not do such a thing to cultural artifacts. "Or what? Can we perhaps be compared to the stupid pastor in Helgafell who had his servants burn the manuscripts?" (in Icelandic: "eða hvað? Stöndum við kannski í svipuðum sporum og heimski presturinn á Helgafelli sem lét húskarla sína og vinnukonur bera út handritin og kveikja í þeim?"). Guðmundur points out that the nature in the interior is now considered of use as "fuel" for the economy by using it for dams and hydroelectric power stations. He argues: "The struggle over the interior is about unmeasured wealth. This wealth is at the core … of what it is worth to be an Icelander" (in Icelandic: "Hálendisbaráttan snýst um ómæld auðæfi. Þau varða kjarna þess að lifa og hvers virði það er að vera Íslendingur").

Birgir Sigurðsson and Guðmundur Páll Ólafsson seem to be employing the discursive themes of nationalism as social strategies to try to enhance views against the power station approach. To further suggest the strengthening of the relationship of nature and national identity as discursive themes, I like to the quote president Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson's second inaugural speech, August 1, 2000: "The identity of Icelanders and respect will increasingly be drawn from our devotion with Icelandic nature, the beautiful creation, which has made Iceland so unique in the world" (in Icelandic: "Sjálfsmynd Íslendinga og virðing mun í vaxandi mæli ráðast af hollustu okkar við íslenska náttúru, það fagra sköpunarverk sem gert hefur Ísland svo einstakt í veröldinni", Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson 2000).

In contrast to nationalism, references to global responsibilities and international agreements have, traditionally, not had the status of symbolic power in Icelandic society. Although I believe, from what I have found in my scrutiny of newspaper debates in the 1990s, that this might be changing, my goal with the discussion here is not to evaluate the scope of that change. Rather, I aim to cast some light on how global references are used in environmental discussions today.

In the two debates I analyzed, both parties use global arguments. In the dark—green debate, the dark protectionists refer to the precautionary principle and use arguments derived from science. They also argue that Icelanders have a global or at least European responsibility to protect Ódáðahraun. Green protectionists also use global arguments: they point out that we have a global responsibility for using our vast land to grow forests or the Alaska lupine that can bind carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. This last argument seems to be more and more used.

Global arguments are also used in the North East interior debate. Those for the power station approach argue that Iceland has a global responsibility for protecting the largest unpopulated area in Europe, and those against the power station approach argue that we have a global responsibility for using our "clean" energy resources for the benefit of the world.

All parties tend to relate to the global value of their interests by the tourist industry. Birgir Sigurðsson (1998, see above) requests "our responsibility towards our own natural wealth is much greater than many other nations' responsibility because in our unspoilt nature is richness lost to most other nations". Further, I observed several references to the Ramsar wetland list, the Rio declaration, and several other such agreements on nature protection. Sustainable development and a "pure" image of the country's nature are also often mentioned. A case in point are references to the international ban on the catching of whales and how much it would hurt the Icelandic tourist industry to begin catching whales again (e.g., Páll Þór Jónsson 1997).

Recent discussion concerns how to combat the greenhouse effect by binding carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The Kyoto meeting in 1997 seems to have given this discussion some fuel. The Icelandic government has not signed the Kyoto Protocol because it believes that Iceland should be given larger quotas in greenhouse gas emissions than the Kyoto Protocol suggests; Iceland already would have a permission to increase its emission of greenhouse gas by 10 per cent. The decision not to sign the Kyoto Protocol unless Iceland will be given a larger quota than the Kyoto Protocol suggests is, of course, controversial.

What should Iceland do to contribute to the world in regard to combating the greenhouse effect? I have investigated a recent few articles on that issue. My reading of these articles suggests there might be a spectrum of perspectives. I only investigate very few examples and selected seven authors. I arrange the discussion so that I have those who are most radical in the sense of that we should not do much in combating the greenhouse effect to those who are most against Iceland's specific gas emissions quotas.

Chemist Glúmur Jón Björnsson (1998) doubts that the greenhouse effect is as serious as expected when an international agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol is discussed. He argues against the precautionary principle and says that contemporary well being of people should enjoy doubt in this case. He points out that it is important for developing nations to be able to use their resources without limits imposed by doubtful decisions. Further, he criticizes environmentalists for claiming that they are thinking about our children when they like to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and argues that they will have much more effective technical solutions than we have to combat the greenhouse effect if it is a problem by then.

Former chief of the National Energy Authority (Orkustofnun) Jakob Björnsson (1998) points out that the Kyoto Protocol would not allow, for instance, Iceland to increase its greenhouse gas emission by, say, 25% (about 700 thousands tons of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases), even if that would actually be to save the atmosphere three times that amount. Using Icelandic hydroelectric power for an aluminium smelter instead of building it where there is not such power, he argues, can do this. Jakob Björnsson (1999c) also discusses the need to think about the global effects of using our resources however small on a global scale to contribute to the earth.

Head scientist of the Soil Conservation Service Andrés Arnalds (1999a, b) discusses the relationship between different international agreements concerning climate change, biological diversity, and desertification that have been the results of the Rio conference in 1992. He discusses the need for Iceland to have land reclamation and soil conservation accepted as a method to bind carbon dioxide (forest growing is an accepted method already). Further, Iceland is emphasizing that the binding of carbon dioxide is an effective method to work in accordance with different international agreements.

Political scientist Auður Ingólfsdóttir (1998, 2000) argues that it is every one's responsibility to do something about climate change caused by people. She also discusses the different interests of developing nations and industrialized nations towards the reduction of greenhouse gas emission. She criticizes the position of the Icelandic government to demand greater quotas for an increase in greenhouse gas emission than determined by the Kyoto Protocol and suggests that Iceland contributes to conceptual work on designing rules about the trading of emissions quotas. Such rules, she says, should act in favor of clean, sustainable energy being used, whether in Iceland or elsewhere, and whether hydroelectric, solar, or wind energy. Then and then only could we talk about global benefits.

Economist and director of the Organization for the Icelandic Environment (Landvernd) Tryggvi Felixson (2000) criticizes the view represented here by Jakob Björnsson that someone is going to produce aluminium. He argues that this may not be true. He says that some fiber materials, stronger and lighter than aluminium, have already been created; these materials may be used in the future to build airplanes and other transportation devices. Furthermore, we should emphasize finding methods for producing aluminium that do not create greenhouse gases. If these two things happen, then the economic benefits of producing hydroelectric power in Iceland might not be as great as pretended by those for the power station approach.

Columnist Illugi Jökulsson (1999) in his weekly radio commentary makes fun of the Icelandic government and its "fight" against The monster from Kyoto. He compares this monster with communism by beginning the piece with paraphrasing the first words of the Communist Manifesto: "A ghost is haunting the world … a terrible monster from Japan, determined to destroy everything that happens to stand in her way …" (in Icelandic: "Vofa gengur nú ljósum logum um veröldina; hræðileg forynja, komin frá Japan, staðráðin í því að leggja í rúst hvaðeina sem á vegi hennar verður, hún svífst einskis í grimmd sinni og ofsa"). This ghost is named the Kyoto Protocol. And the only one who fights against it, the only one who understands the danger of it, is the Icelandic government. The foreign minister, Halldór Ásgrímsson, acts a hero like he were Bruce Willis or Arnold Schwartzenegger. He quotes that Halldór has threatened Icelanders that we could say goodbye to the welfare system if we sign the Kyoto Protocol that would effectively prevent new aluminium smelters in Iceland. While Illugi's talk was humorous, it is equally clear that he does not believe that the Kyoto Protocol threatens the Icelandic welfare system.

Representative of Iceland Nature Conservation Association (Náttúruverndarsamtök Íslands) Árni Finnsson (2000a, b) points out that environmental issues are now more global than ever. He protests the words of the chief of the National Power Company, Friðrik Sophusson, who had argued that environmental discussion is symbolized by neo-romantic nationalism (see also "Nýrómantísk þjóðernishyggja í umhverfismálum" 2000). Árni claims that it was not neo-romantic nationalism that caused the decision of Norsk Hydro to pull out of negotiations about an aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður; rather, Norsk Hydro did not want to destroy Eyjabakkar with a dam without a legal process of environmental impact assessment. Árni also mentions a number of international agreements that those against the power station in the North East interior have used as arguments. Árni even suggests that Morgunblaðið, the largest Icelandic newspaper, has used global references. He criticizes the interest of the Icelandic government to ask for larger quotas for greenhouse gas emission and emphasizes that international cooperation is the only answer in the struggle against global climate change, pollution, the erosion of the ozone layer, and other such things. Further, he criticizes the Icelandic government for not having educated the public about climate change as required in the convention on climate change.

Two types of positions are on one end of the spectrum. One is the Glúmur Jón argument that we should just wait. (This argument is also mentioned by Auður Ingólfsdóttir (1998), citing "Harvard-educated economist David Montgomery who at a conference Auður attended said that we could wait and see for 15 years because then we would have found better techniques to combat greenhouse gas emission.) The other is the argument that aluminium smelters are built because the world needs aluminium; therefore, it is better to build them in Iceland using hydroelectric power than to build them where more carbon dioxide polluting fuel is used. These discursive themes have different possibilities in being legitimated. The Glúmur Jón argument may not be taken seriously but the "the world needs aluminium" argument is the official position of the Icelandic government. The Glúmur Jón argument would, however, be the consequence of more aluminium smelters; that is, we wait and we see, and we might come up with better techniques. So this is a discursive connection of actually not waiting and seeing, as Glúmur Jón suggests, but actively increasing greenhouse gas emission. On the other end are arguments presented by Árni Finnsson and in part by Illugi that we must look globally at things and we must cooperate and comply. The arguments that Andrés and Auður present can be considered representing a "middle" position in this discourse; they certainly look globally at things but to me it seems that they are not adopting themes that belong to the discursive pole of "dark" nature protection. If to group them, they might be "green" protectionists because they employ green themes, while Árni and Illugi employ themes of "dark" protection and Glúmur Jón and Jakob for power stations. Tryggvi also employs themes against the power station approach, themes that are to a certain extent more radical than Árni's and Illugi's views.

Are global references gaining clout as capital in these discussions? Yes, they are. But to which extent, I do not know. The greatest extent is to be measured, not really done here, in that it seems that most of those who talk about environment and nature now refer to global issues or interests, if not as their own arguments, then to refuse that others see things in a proper global perspective.

Global arguments are not necessarily gaining clout on the cost of any specific legitimating principle of those I have identified in this report. Rather the discussion seems to go its own route, in particular, the discussions on issues relating to the Kyoto Protocol and greenhouse gas emissions. So in the study I believe I have discovered a spectrum of global references concerning climate change and the Kyoto Protocol that I did not expect.

At the beginning of the paper I asked several questions that I now will try to answer. The answers are speculations and preliminary conclusions about how nature is constructed through discourse, how nature is capital, and the social strategies of legitimation and delegitimation. I also discuss ways to continue the study. Finally I contemplate about the usefulness of the concepts I use in the study.

My first set of questions is What is nature? and Is nature constructed through discourse? Such questions may create the response Why these questions? Questioning what is nature and discussing how nature is not only landscaped by people but also constructed in discourse is not necessarily a popular exercise from the viewpoint of the public who wants to enjoy nature. I use the verb "landscaped" here as a common term for what we have done with nature for good or bad: building roads, growing trees, drying wetlands, building dams, creating gardens, protecting soil, reclaiming land, and so forth. The lake in the middle of Reykjavík, Tjörnin, and the wetlands around the Reykjavík airport are examples of how people have tried to protect a natural setting where some of the wetland has been dried, streets and an airport have been paved, and houses erected. Yet there is wildlife on Tjörnin and its surroundings, especially birds.

The line between what is nature and what is not natural is contested. Dark and green protectionists contested the Hólasandur project and debated the cutting of the Alaska lupine in Skaftafell. Dark protectionists seem to subscribe to the view that the laws of nature should be allowed to function as much as possible, particularly in national parks. Green protectionists often declare that nature protection must involve reclaiming nature. I believe that in both cases, there are underlying aesthetic reasons. A sense of beauty creates a firm belief of both these groups that lets them discuss what is nature. Both groups also tend to talk about "unspoilt" nature. Dark protectionists refer to scientific principles and the land as it is, in particular lava, sand, and areas that are significant or unique enough to be national parks or natural monuments; green protectionists are fond of areas that are well-grown and want to reclaim land by growing grass and forests. The sense of guilt about what our predecessors have done to the land is very important, especially for green protectionists.

To better understand debates and practices, I believe we should be careful in employing the distinction between what is "unspoilt" or not. It is very clear that dark and green protectionists see unspoilt nature differently: dark protectionists see it as the land is, but green protectionists believe they should change it to a state it was in before man arrived in Iceland. Dark protectionists accuse green protectionists of wanting to help the land, which for the green protectionists is so right that the critique becomes a painful attack on their very identity as protectionists. And while those for power stations in the North East interior do not say that a 200 meters high dam is unspoilt nature, they often refer to the interests of people in the dams, in the power stations, etc.

I like to introduce the concepts landscaped nature and discoursed nature as more viable concepts than unspoilt/damaged nature to understand the debates on use and protection of nature. Both those concepts deny the essentialism involved in the concept of unspoilt nature. Landscaped and discoursed natures have in common that the boundaries of what is landscaped and what is discoursed are not always clear. What I mean by landscaped nature is a place that has been changed by people by some deliberate actions. Roads and dams, most forests and dried wetlands are, then, examples of landscaped nature. Tjörnin in Reykjavík and Hólasandur are landscaped in this sense. Landscape architect Anna Whiston Spirn (1995) has also describes how the Boston Fens and Riverways, widely assumed to be preserved bits of nature, were designed and created in the 1880s and 1890s. And known is the example of Central Park í New York.

What I mean by discoursed nature is that the meanings that we give to use and protection of nature, whether "real", unspoilt, or landscaped, is shaped through discursive struggles. But how can nature change by being protected? Well, it is not nature that changes but the meaning, the significance of nature, even its economic value. For example, to be considered as a national park, nature must have certain characteristics of uniqueness and size; people must not have changed it too much recently; and it has to be state-owned.

But why protect nature? Halldór Laxness (1987/1970, p. 126) puts this eloquently: "The idea that nature is beautiful does not flow from farmers but from people living in the large cities of our times and finally reached Iceland from Germany through Denmark in the times of our grandfathers".*) Nature is only beautiful by comparison, Halldór argues. If there is only countryside, then nature is not beautiful. Now, in the 20^th century, when people have fled the countryside because of economic reasons and become city people, sometimes living in undesirable situations, "unspoilt nature" first becomes beautiful by comparison with such cities. Halldór is accurate in that historically nature protection received its meaning by city people who wanted "natural" sites. So before there was no such thing as nature because it did not have the meaning or the value that nature has now. The city people do not necessarily ask if the nature is "unspoilt" or "real" but rather if it is beautiful and useful for outdoor recreation and enjoyment.

Nature is not only protected for recreation and enjoyment. Dark protectionists in particular refer to scientific reasons, for instance they talk about biological diversity or unique geology. Therefore, we must preserve the land, i.e., nature, as it is. But nature protection, whether for the benefit of city people or because of scientific purposes, changes the meaning and the value of the land. But the historical connection is that city people construct nature, they "discourse" nature as I have chosen to say.

Sites that have not really been touched and not visited by many, such as places in the North East interior, may be as close to being unspoilt nature as a place can be. I contend that both Ódáðahraun in the power line dispute and the dark—green debate and Eyjabakkar in the North East interior debate changed meanings. Their capital got enhanced by the fact that more people became aware of them.

In the power line dispute and the dark—green debate, dark protectionists discussed the value of Ódáðahraun as a large unpopulated area worth much. Later, that is, in the power station debate, the entire North East interior was discussed as having value as the largest unpopulated area in all Europe. So I contend that there is a change in meaning and an increase in value here. As I see it, Ódáðahraun became a symbol for the dark protectionist view.

It is even more true that the meaning and discursive value of Eyjabakkar has changed. They were not a highlighted part of school geography or literature (or were they any part of it at all) as Ódáðahraun has been (Outlaws lived at the outskirts of Ódáðahraun, and poets wrote about the vast lava area as mythical. For me, it never was mythical as I travelled through it while rounding up the sheep in September, first in 1968, shortly after Neil Armstrong was there.) Those for the power station talked about Eyjabakkar as useless and that no one had seen them or even knew about them. The discursive struggle changed the notoriety of the area, and now it symbolizes the struggle against power stations. It remains to be seen what will be the value of Eyjabakkar in the near and far future. And Eyjabakkar did not seem to attract this attention in the powerline dispute in the early 1990s; only in the late 1990s they became the powerful symbol that we observe today. (The story of the "discoursing" of Eyjabakkar is certainly worth a more detailed study than is conducted here.)

Sites are not just landscaped or discoursed. Most "natural" sites are probably both. A good example is how Frederick Law Olmsted envisioned Yosemite national park. According to Spirn (1995), his proposals were "deceptively simple: provide free access for all visitors in a manner that preserved the valley's scenic qualities" (p. 93). He proposed paths and prospects so that these "landscaped" things would not be seen from the other side of the valley. The story of Yosemite will not be told here; I understand that Yosemite's atmosphere is very polluted with a great number of traffic jams. What interests me here is how it was constructed as a national park by minor landscaping and by giving it the label and meaning of a national park. I now turn to a discussion of how discourse works in constructing what counts as capital.

The questions to be dealt with in this section are How is nature as capital?, What are the strategies of legitimation and delegitimation? and How are discursive themes employed as social strategies in these debates? We have now seen that it is contested what is nature and because it is contested what is nature, then it would be interesting to know which position has the most symbolic power in the struggle over what counts as nature. Further, nature as cultural capital does not always count as symbolic because economic interests frame much of the discussion (that is, economic capital has more symbolic power than nature as cultural capital).

I have no possibility of measuring here what is the most symbolic capital as it concerns nature. But I will consider how important discursive themes are employed and to some extent what counts as capital on each end of the spectra of legitimating principles that I have identified. Therefore I take certain important discursive themes and show how they are employed and have come to count as the symbolic capital of certain groups.

It seems rather clear that economic capital is most determining in the debate about the North East interior. Economic interests frame the discussion although many writers discuss the "emotional value" of the interior (former prime minister Steingrímur Hermannsson 1999) or the "living emotional relationship" with the previously unaccessible land (Birgir Sigurðsson 1998).When nature protectionists talk about beauty as a natural resource or national parks as land "use" they have adopted the economic language. In the Bourdieuean terminology, they try to convert cultural capital into symbolic capital by not challenging economic interests. I believe the same thing may apply to the fact that Iceland Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service in Iceland are discussing and researching the binding of carbon dioxide.

But then, how, is nature cultural capital? Nature is cultural capital in a variety of ways. In the first place, it seems so that the protection of nature is and has been considered culture. For example, until recently (about ten years ago when the ministry of the environment was established), nature protection belonged to the ministry of education, science, and culture. Further, most people enjoy nature in their spare time. The connection between admiring nature and Icelandic nationalism is also a matter of cultural capital. But when tourism is growing, enjoying nature becomes interrelated into work.

How nature counts as capital, more precisely cultural capital, is different on each end of the two spectra I have studied. This is very clear about the spectrum in the dark sands—green forest debate. Economic discussion is not what governs that discussion, although economic arguments certainly enter the discussion.

What is interesting to observe is how discursive themes are used as strategies of distinction in different ways. A case in point is the debate about the Alaska lupine. For dark protectionists, the lupine is an enemy of "real" nature where its law should govern the process. It also is and has been the official position of the Nature Conservation Agency to destroy or at least try to prevent the outspreading of the lupine in the Skaftafell national park. But has the against-the-lupine approach gained much value as cultural capital? Probably not. But it is a strategy of distinction, and its value lies, first and foremost, in the distinction because there is not much money or power in cutting away the lupine.

The publicizing of Ólafur Arnalds' award signifies research as a growing strategy of the Soil Conservation Service. Research is also increasing its discursive importance with the Forest Service. I do not know how much the "green" public sees research as cultural capital, but scientific nature protection has always been a theme of distinction for dark nature protectionists. Therefore, the use of research in land reclamation and forest growing is important as a possible bridge between dark and green nature protection. Thus research and science seem to be employed as social strategies to convert discursive themes into cultural capital.

I have already indicated that economic interests govern the spectrum about the North East interior and will not discuss it further here. I have also talked about the interconnections of nationalism with nature and discussed how certain individuals use global references. I consider global references as important themes that can be used in different ways as strategies of distinction. Dark nature protectionists have always used them quite a bit, green protectionists seem to be using it more and more, and those for the power station in the North East interior are also using global references.

The greatest value of discursive themes as cultural capital that dark protectionists who are also fighting for a national park in the North East interior can gain at the moment could be a distinctive value, value that is created by the opposition with the position of the National Power Company. But distinctive value matters because it brings with it greater possibilities to be noticed.

The questions to be discussed here are Are legitimating principles in the debates?and Are there spectra? I studied two main spectra, the dark—green protection spectrum and the for and against power station in the North East interior spectrum. I also discovered an emerging spectrum of global references in discussions about climate change and whether Iceland should assume responsibility in actions combating the greenhouse effect. This was a spectrum that I did not necessarily expect to find and will be interesting to study further as the discussion has probably only just begun.

Many issues remain to be studied further. Especially, I believe it might be interesting to study the divisions within the against-the-power-station approach. My guess is that there are divisions, particularly between green and dark protectionists. There is also a possibility that there are not two spectra that we are watching but one spectrum with three main concentration points where dark protection is on one end and the power station approach on the other, while there is a green concentration point somewhere on the way or a little to the side. In fact, these groups might be strikingly similar to the groups (i.e., business, environmentalists, and radical environmentalists) identified by Spangle and Knapp (1996). However, I shall make no attempt at all to compare them to the three approaches in Iceland; they are not unrelated but the legitimating principles in Iceland are very much shaped by the historical and political context. Most importantly the relationship between how nationalism is employed as a social strategy by all camps, sometimes interrelated with the use of global references.

• It would be interesting to see if the power station approach and green nature protection can live side-by-side, for instance because of the ability of forests to bind the carbon dioxide. As a dark protectionist I worry.
• Nationalism and global references need be studied and their relationship with other issues.
• Documents and policy from Iceland Forest Service, the Soil Conservation Service, the Nature Conservation Agency, and other such organizations.
• The environmental statements of businesses and industries to see how they use nature as cultural capital. The oil companies are a case in point, but other firms might be just as interesting.
• A further study of outdoor strategies (see Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 1998/1994) by, for instance, investigating their written goals, practices, offerings of activities, etc., but also by interviewing the leaders of outdoor and recreation associations. The goal would be to identify how discursive themes and practices are employed as social strategies to gain cultural and social capital, at least as distinctive from other practices.

The question I like to discuss here is Are the concepts discursive theme, social strategies, capital, and legitimating principles useful concepts to investigate the discourse on nature? My aims with this research are of two types. One goal is to utilize the concepts discursive themes, social strategies, cultural and symbolic capital, and legitimating principles that I have borrowed from Bourdieu and Foucault. Another goal is to map discursive themes and legitimating principles in the discourse on use and protection of nature as well as identify the social strategies that the players in the debates use to increase the symbolic power of their discursive themes and discursive position.

The discussion in this report has been towards the latter goal, and a discussion about the actual theoretical benefits of the concepts must wait. The first goal is a part of a larger project. I have used Bourdieuean and Foucaultian concepts to study aspects of society for over ten years, most notably, of course, education (e.g., Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson 1993, 1996, 1999b).

There is one thing I like, however, to emphasize here: this way of conceptualizing the debates on use and protection of nature brings well out the constructed character of all positions and opinions in the debates on nature. For those of us who tend be zealous "nature lovers", we must let our beliefs blind us a little less in our struggles and understand that our discursive themes may have merely distinctive value but only a small chance of acquiring the symbolic capital of an aluminium smelter. I believe it is helpful to unpack some of our discursive themes by observing how we use them as social strategies for distinction.

It could be argued that emphasizing this as some kind of a "game", as some of the metaphors imply, is belittling our beliefs and struggles. I believe that is very wrong for at least two reasons. One is that there is a social field where the struggles take place, and we do not decide that the "inner value" of nature will determine what is going to happen. In part because we do not have the power, but in part because there is no such inner value although I might sometimes talk about, for instance, Ódáðahraun as having inner value. The other reason of not being afraid to talk about difficult struggles is that we must have some enjoyment in what we are doing. I believe that Bourdieuean concepts are concepts that can be played with. But I would be leaning to some "inner value" arguments if I would say that conducting the busy work of this study in the weeks after the Planning Agency allowed mining more diatiomaceous mud from the bottom of Mývatn has been a good therapy. It is not a therapy but reflexivity to stand a little back and attempt to map what has "worked" and not worked in the debates.

Andrés Arnalds. 1997. "Endurheimt landkosta á Reykjanesskaga". [The reclamation of land in Reykjanesskagi.] Morgunblaðið June 1, pp. E14–15.

Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson. 1996. „Teachers' Work and Theories of Professionalism: Conceptualizing a New Approach". Presentation at the American Educational Research Association conference, New York, 8–12 apríl 1996

Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson. 1998/1992. "Ímyndin um óspillta náttúru og sanna Sögueyjarmenningu: Ferðalög um ofurraunveruleika hins vestræna heims". [The image of unspoilt nature and true Saga Island culture: Travels in the Western Worlds' hyperreality]. Lesbók Morgunblaðsins June 20.

Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson. 1998/1993. "Græðum með gát — hugleiðingar um skógrækt, landgræðslu og friðun náttúru". [Cultivate carefully. Thoughts on forest growing, soil conservation, and protection of nature]. Freyr 89(1–2), pp. 44–47.

Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson. 1998/1994. "Útivist sem táknrænn höfuðstóll. Orðræðan um útivist og náttúruvernd í ljósi kenninga franska félags- og mannfræðingsins Pierre Bourdieu". [Outdoor life as symbolic capital. The discourse on outdoor life and nature conservation in the light of Pierre Bourdieu's theories]. Náttúrusýn. Safn greina um siðfræði og náttúru. [How people see nature. Collection of articles on ethics and nature]. (Þorvarður Árnason and Róbert H. Haraldsson, eds.). Reykjavík: Siðfræðistofnun Háskóla Íslands, pp. 169–181.

Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson. 1998. Litast um af Hjallhól. Vefútgáfa greina og erinda, 1981–1998.

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